Battered Women Syndrome as a Tort Cause of Action by Tonsing, Heather
Cleveland State University
EngagedScholarship@CSU
Journal of Law and Health Law Journals
1998
Battered Women Syndrome as a Tort Cause of
Action
Heather Tonsing
Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/jlh
Part of the Torts Commons
How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of
Law and Health by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.
Recommended Citation
Note, Battered Women Syndrome as a Tort Cause of Action, 12 J.L. & Health 407 (1997-1998)
BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME AS A TORT CAUSE
OF ACTION
I. OVERVIEW OF BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME .............. 409
A. The Battering Cycle ............................ 411
B. Learned Helplessness ........................... 412
C. Other Factors Affecting Battered Women ........... 413
D. Health Implications of Battered Women Syndrome ... 415
II. BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT .... 417
A. Self-Defense and Expert Testimony on Battered
Women Syndrome ............................. 418
B. Battered Women Syndrome as a "Special" Defense ... 423
C. Evidence of Battered Women Syndrome in Other
Criminal Cases ................................ 425
III. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL LITIGATION ................ 426
A. Traditional Tort Actions Involving Domestic
A buse ....................................... 426
1. Assault and Battery ........................ 428
2. Intentional or Reckless Infliction of Emotional
D istress .................................. 430
B. Non-Traditional Domestic Torts .................. 432
C. Obstacles to Domestic Tort Suits ................. 433
1. Interspousal Tort Immunity ................. 433
2. Statute of Limitations ...................... 434
3. The Option of a Continuing Tort ............. 435
4. Joinder and Res Judicata .................... 437
IV. BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME AS AN AFFIRMATIVE TORT
CAUSE OF ACTION ................................... 438
A. Cases Which Come Close to Recognizing a New
Tort of Battered Women Syndrome ................ 439
B. The New Jersey Cases .......................... 441
C. Why this New Cause of Action is Necessary ......... 444
V. THE TORT OF BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME AS A SOLUTION
TO A PUBLIC HEALTH PROBLEM ........................ 446
VI. CONCLUSION ..................................... 448
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
INTRODUCTION
The alert horn which sounds every time a door is opened at the shelter
reminds me of the very real danger confronting battered women in our society.1
Although the domestic violence epidemic is now well documented,2 society
and the legal system have not done all they can to help these women. While
many courts have recognized the use of battered women syndrome3 in criminal
prosecutions, 4 the legal system has not adequately responded to making
victims of domestic violence whole.
Testimony on battered women syndrome is now commonly used in various
types of litigation.5 Yet, a relatively recent development is the use of battered
women syndrome as an affirmative cause of action for continuous wrongs
perpetrated on women. Battered women face various barriers to litigation
when attempting to use traditional tort actions. Thus, an innovative solution
is necessary to accomplish society's goals of tort law and simultaneously
attempt to solve a national public heath problem.
The role of tort law traditionally serves several important functions. A tort's
primary purpose is to provide compensation for the victim, restoring parties
1The shelter referred to is the Center for the Prevention of Domestic Violence in
Cleveland, Ohio.
2"[T]he FBI and other law enforcement experts believe that wife abuse is the most
unreported crime in the United States." State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 370 (N.J. 1984). See
also LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 19 (1979) [hereinafter WALKER, THE
BATTERED WOMAN] Yet some national estimates indicate that as many as four million
women are abused each year. Ariella Hyman et al., Laws Mandating Reporting of Domestic
Violence: Do They Promote Patient Well-Being, 273 JAMA 1781 (1995), available in Westlaw,
1995 WL 10027577. Other statistics indicate that the number may now be as high as six
million women annually. CLEVELAND WOMEN, INC., TEMPLUM: COMMITED TO ENDING
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE THROUGH SERVICE, EDUCATION, AND SOCIAL CHANGE (1996). Women
are injured in domestic assaults more than injuries from auto accidents, rapes and
muggings combined. Nancy Gibbs, 'Til Death Do Us Part, TIME, Jan. 18, 1993, at 38,41.
3The term "battered women syndrome" is also seen in the literature as "battered
women's syndrome." I choose the spelling of the former simply because Lenore Walker,
who was the first who developed the theory, spelled it that way. Furthermore, the
former spelling is more commonly used in the literature.
4 Lenore E.A. Walker, Understanding Battered Women Syndrome: Victims and Violence,
TRIAL, Feb. 1, 1995, [hereinafter Walker, Understanding BWS], available in Westlaw, 1995
WL 15142585 at *2. Some states have even codified legal decisions, sanctioning the use
of expert testimony on Battered Women's Syndrome. Id.
5 Dr. Lenore Walker, a psychologist who developed the theory, cites some instances
in which such testimony has proved helpful: (1) in response to criminal charges against
a battered woman (self-defense and duress defenses); (2) in criminal courts to convict
batterers when the woman is too frightened to testify; (3) in family courts when
considering child custody disputes and property settlements; (4) in civil litigation to
prove liability and damages; and (5) in coercive contract disputes and will contests.
Walker, Understanding BWS, supra note 4 at *2.
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to their original condition insofar as the law can do this. 6 Tort law also punishes
wrongdoing and deters future harmful behavior.7 It encourages socially
responsible behavior and provides a peaceful means for adjudicating the rights
of parties who might otherwise take the law into their own hands. Finally, tort
law is a means for educating the public, demanding political action, and
solving public health problems.8
The focus of this Note is the upcoming development of a new tort cause of
action which would afford battered women full recovery and also help alleviate
a growing public health epidemic. This Note argues that battered women
syndrome is a valid psychological theory which has a place in civil litigation
as a recognized cause of action. Although the theory is criticized by feminist
scholars who believe that the testimony may perpetuate gender bias in criminal
trials,9 the syndrome is still advantageous for women seeking redress in civil
courts. Part I examines the phenomenon of battered women syndrome and its
effects on the health of women subjected to domestic abuse. Part II discusses
the various uses of battered women syndrome in criminal trials. Specifically,
this section focuses on issues surrounding the use of expert testimony on
battered women syndrome to support self-defense and duress defenses. Part
III explores traditional tort causes of action currently available to victims of
domestic abuse. It argues that these actions are inadequate because women are
denied full recovery for all of their injuries. Part IV urges recognition of battered
women syndrome as a new tort cause of action. This new tort would allow
women suffering from battered women syndrome to receive full compensation
from their batterers for injuries occurring during the entire course of the
abusive relationship. Part V demonstrates how tort litigation is a necessary tool
to help solve this growing public health problem.
I. OVERVIEW OF BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME
Lenore E. Walker coined the phrase "Battered Women Syndrome" in 1979.10
She defined those suffering from this syndrome as any woman1 1 "who is
6 W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 2, at 7 (5th ed.
1984) [hereinafter PROSSER &KEETON].
71d. § 2, at 11-12.
8Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 STAN L REv.
853, 877-78 (1992).
9See infra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
1 OWALKER, TIE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2. Walker's model of the battering
relationship is arguably the most "widely-accepted." Beth I.Z. Boland, Battered Women
Who Act Under Duress, 28 NEW ENG. L. REv. 603,608 (1994). However, feminist scholars
criticize this definition as "rigid and static" excluding "women with diverse experiences
who do not fit a particular mold or stereotype." Elizabeth M. Schneider, Resistance to
Equality, 57 U. PrmT. L. REv. 477,497 (1996). Further, feminists believe that the term has
negative connotations of women as victims instead of survivors, reinforcing gender bias
in society. Id. at 498. Lenore Walker acknowledges the criticism of feminists regarding
expert testimony on battered women syndrome yet believes that "[firom a purely
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repeatedly subjected to any forceful physical or psychological behavior by a
man in order to coerce her to do something he wants her to do without any
concern for her rights."12 For classification as a battered woman, the couple
must experience the battering cycle at least two times.13 In a variety of
instances, many courts now admit expert testimony on battered women
syndrome 14 and some explicitly cite Lenore Walker's research and her
definition. 15
practical point of view, at the present time in our system there is ample justification for
expert witness testimony." LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE, 11 (1989) [hereinafter
WALKER, TERRIYING LovE].
1 t For the purposes of this note, domestic violence refers to the abuse of a woman by
her male partner. I do not address the abuse of males by their female partners or
domestic violence between lesbian and gay couples. For a discussion of homosexuality
and domestic violence, see Denise Bricker, Note, Fatal Defense: An Analysis of Battered
Women's Syndrome Expert Testimony for Gay Men and Lesbians Who Kill Their Abusive
Partners, 58 BROOK. L. REv. 1379 (1993); Carla M. da Luz, A Legal and Social Comparison of
Heterosexual and Same-Sex Domestic Violence: Similar Inadequacies in Legal Recognition and
Response, 4 S. CAL. REV. L. &WOMEN'S STUD. 251 (1994).
1 2 WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2.
13Id.
14 Linda L. Ammons, Mules, Madonnas, Babies, Bath Water, Racial Imagery and
Stereotypes: The African-American Woman and the Battered Woman Syndrome, 1995 Wis. L.
REv. 1003, o8on.7(1995) [hereinafter Ammons, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes], cites examples
of state and federal court cases accepting expert testimony on battered women
syndrome: Smith v. State, 277 S.E.2d 678 (Ga. 1981); State v. Hodges, 716 P.2d 563 (Kan.
1986); overruled in part by State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572 (Kan. 1988); State v. Anaya,
438 A.2d 892 (Me. 1981); State v. Baker, 424 A.2d 171 (N.H. 1980); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d
364 (N.J. 1984); People v. Torres, 488 N.Y.S.2d 358 (N.Y. Super. Ct. 1985); State v. Allery,
682 P.2d 312 (Wash. 1984); United States v. Taylor, 820 F. Supp. 124 (S.D.N.Y. 1993);
Fennell v. Goolsby, 630 F. Supp. 451 (E.D. Pa. 1985). See also Monique M. Gousie, From
Self-Defense to Coercion: McMaugh v. State Use of Battered Women's Syndrome to Defend
Wife's Involvement in Third-Party Murder, 28 NEw ENG. L. REv. 453,481 n.40 (listing cases
in several states accepting evidence of battered women syndrome but noting that not
all states have permitted its use).
15 1bn-Tamas v. United States, 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (holding that the
testimony by Lenore Walker on her theory of battered women syndrome in a claim of
self-defense was not inadmissible); State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 371 (N.J. 1984)
(specifically relying on Lenore Walker's theory as a basis for holding that battered
women syndrome is relevant to support defendant's claim of self-defense); McMaugh
v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 731 (R.I. 1992) (citing Lenore Walker's definition of a battered
woman). But see Robert F. Schoop et al, Battered Woman Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and
the Distinction Between Justification and Excuse, 1994U. ILL. L. REv. 45, 63 (1994) (criticizing
Walker's research and theory of battered women syndrome stating that "Inleither
Walker's data nor the later studies sufficiently support the battered woman syndrome
as a pattern regularly produced by battering relationships"); Shelby A.D. Moore, Battered
Woman Syndrome: Selling the Shadow to Support the Substance, 38 How. L.J. 297,317 (1995)
("two major concerns persist regarding the battered woman syndrome in that the
underlying research and methodology appear to have a direct bearing on the
syndrome's relevance and reliability").
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A. The Battering Cycle
There are two distinct components of battered women syndrome, the
abusive battering cycle and the resulting phenomenon of learned helplessness.
The battering cycle consists of three phases which vary in duration and
intensity.16 According to Walker, based on research of 1,600 abusive instances
reported by 400 women, the phases involve a period of "tension building,"
"acute battering," and a period of "loving-contrition or absence of tension." 17
In the first phase, the woman is subjected to "minor" battering incidents.
Responding to these incidents, the woman often assumes responsibility for the
batterer's actions by either assuring herself that she will be able to calm the
batterer, or just attempting to stay out of his way "It is not that she believes she
should be abused; rather, she believes that what she does will prevent his anger
from escalating."18 She rationalizes the incident while attempting to control
external factors which might set off an acute battering. This "psychological
torture," coping with the batterer's oppressive jealousy, brutality and
humiliation, is "reportedly the most difficult to handle."19 Eventually, the
tension becomes intolerable. In some cases, although unusual, the women
triggers the second phase because she can no longer endure the anxiety of the
inevitable period which follows. 20 More commonly, an event in the male
batterer's life triggers the second phase.21
The acute battering phase is "characterized by the uncontrollable discharge
of the tensions that have built up during phase one. This lack of control and its
major destructiveness distinguish the acute battering incident from the minor
battering incidents in phase one."22 The abuse lasts anywhere from two to
twenty four hours, with some women reporting acute battering spanning one
week.23 Women usually take the beatings without resistance and "wait out the
storm."
24
Typically, phase three is marked by a feeling of relief. The batterer is often
sorry for his abusive behavior, convincing himself and his partner that he will
never commit such acts again.25 When women do attempt to remove
16 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 55.
17Lenore Walker, Battered Women Syndrome and Self-Defense, 6 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETIcs &PUB. POL'Y 321, 330 (1992) [hereinafter, Walker, BwS and Self-Defense].
18WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 56.
191d. at 59.
201d. at 60.
21Id.
22 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 59.
231d. at 60.
241d. (emphasis added).
251d. at 65. In some exceptional cases, because the violence is so extreme, women may
never feel out of danger and phase three is not discernible. Walker, Bws and Self-Defense,
1997-98]
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themselves from this cycle of destruction, it usually occurs during this phase.
However, Walker found that although numerous women expressed a desire to
free themselves, many do not follow through.26 Instead, the couple fool
themselves into believing that things will change and the batterer's loving
behavior in phase three, reinforces this belief.27 The cyclical nature of this
relationship partially explains why women stay with their abusers. 28 The
women hope that their partners will change so that they can stay with the man
they love.
B. Learned Helplessness
Another phenomenon, learned helplessness, also contributes to battered
women syndrome. The theory was developed by Martin Seligman who
conducted a study using dogs exposed to electrical shocks. These caged
animals were subjected to random electrical shocks and Seligman "found that
the dogs quickly learned there was nothing they could do to predictably control
the shocks. Eventually, dogs in the experiment appeared to completely cease
all voluntary escape activity."29 Instead of attempting to escape, the dogs
developed ways to cope with the shocks by laying in their fecal matter. This
served to insulate the dogs from the painful shocks.30 Even when the cages
were left opened, the dogs no longer attempted to escape. The researchers then
tried to teach the dogs to escape and they resisted. Only when the dogs were
repeatedly dragged from the cages did they regain their drive to escape.
Researchers determined the dogs developed learned helplessness- because
attempting to escape was futile; coping mechanisms were more effective.31
Learned helplessness refers to the cognitive aspect of a specific situation.32
"[T]he truth or facts of a situation turn out to be less important than the
individual's set of beliefs or perceptions concerning the situation.' 33 Research
indicates that learned helplessness is exhibited in humans as well as lab
animals.3 4 Women who are continually beaten at various random times may
fit this phenomenon. For instance, despite repeated attempts by a woman to
supra note 17, at 330.
26WALKER, THE BArIERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 66-68.
27Id. at 67-68.
28See infra notes 32-55 and accompanying text explaining other factors which keep
women with their abusers.
29WALKER, TERRIFYING LoVE, supra note 10, at 49-50.
301d. at 50.
311d.
321d.
33WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 10, at 50.
34PHIUP G. ZIMBARDO, PSYCHOLOGY AND LIFE 246 (1985).
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control various situations, their batterer inevitably explodes into a fit of rage.
Women begin to "learn" that they cannot control this volatile relationship.
"Once the women are operating from a belief of helplessness, the perception
becomes a reality and they become passive, submissive, 'helpless.' 35 These
repeated batterings, like the electrical shocks administered to Seligman's dogs,
throw women into a state of "psychological paralysis."36
C. Other Factors Affecting Battered Women
Several other factors also contribute to a battered woman's reasons for
remaining in the abusive relationship. Economics, societal expectations, race,
ethnicity, religious beliefs and fear often trap women in the cycle of violence.
Lack of financial resources contributes to a woman's inability to leave her
batterer.37
Even with the progress of the last decade, women typically make less
money and hold less prestigious jobs than men, and are more
responsible for child care. Thus, in a violent confrontation where the
first reaction night be to flee, women realize soon that there may be
no place to go.
The reality for some women is that family or friends cannot help them or
sometimes it is unsafe for women to move where their batterers can find them.
Shelters are often filled to capacity and the hot line workers must refer women
and their children elsewhere or tell them to keep calling to see if there is space.
Other problems occur if the woman is employed but unable to return to her job
because she is fearful of her batterer finding her. Employers are sometimes
tolerant of extended absences but oftentimes, battered women must seek new
employment. Physical injuries may also cause prolonged absences from
work.39 Thus, some women are financially dependent on their batterer and find
it extremely difficult to become stable on their own.
35WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 47.
3 6 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
[W]omen... become so demoralized and degraded by the fact that
they cannot predict or control the violence that they sink into a
state of psychological paralysis and become unable to take any
action at all to improve or alter the situation. There is a tendency
in battered women to believe in the omnipotence or strength of
their battering husbands and thus to feel that any attempt to
resist them is hopeless."
Id. (citations omitted).
3 7 1d.
3 8 1d.
3 9 These are only a few of the financial constraints I have encountered during my
work at a local shelter. For further discussion, see WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMANsupra
note 2, at 127-44 (devoting a chapter to the impact of economic deprivation on battered
women); WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE, supra note 10, at 106-13 (dispelling the myth that all
battered women are poor and discussing the irmpact of economics on all socioeconomic
1997-981
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Abused women are adversely affected by social factors. Battered women are
often afraid or too ashamed to disclose the abuse to family or friends.40 It is not
uncommon for abusive men to force women to cut all ties with family and
friends. 4 1 Further, perpetual female stereotypes of traditional submissive
women reinforce their reasons for staying42 as does society's continued
willingness to keep family matters private.
For some married women with strong religious beliefs, divorce or separation
is not an option.43 Other women believe that separating her children from their
father may be more detrimental than the current situation.44
Although research indicates that race and social class are no indication of the
prevalence of domestic violence; race, ethnicity or culture may play prominent
roles in a woman's decision to leave.45 For instance, in some cultures, "'love,
honor, and obey until death do us part"' is taken literally.46 In other cases, racial
or ethnic minority women
may consider calling the police to be a betrayal not only of her partner,
but of her community as well, where the police and judicial system
levels of battered women); Martha F. Davis &Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women's
Welfare In The Face of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141 (1995) (focusing on the
importance of public assistance for battered women); see also Deborrah Ann Klis, Reforms
to Criminal Defense Instructions: New Patterned Jury Instructions Which Account for the
Experience of the Battered Woman Who Kills Her Battering Mate, 24 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV.
131, 140-42 (1994) (reviewing the external social and economic factors which contribute
to a woman's decision to stay in the abusing relationship); Mary Ann Dutton,
Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence: A Redefinition of Battered Women
Syndrome, 21 HOISTRA L. REV. 1191, 1233-34 (1993) [hereinafter Dutton, Redefinition]
(citing specific barriers contributing to a woman's decision to remain with her batterer.)
40State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 372 (N.J. 1984).
41This isolation results in a woman believing that she has no resources and is trapped.
The Ohio Attorneys' Assault on Domestic Violence: The Who, What, and How of Domestic
Violence Cases, CUYAHOGA CouNTY BAR ASSOCIATION (Dec. 3, 1996) [hereinafter BAR
ASSOCIATION].
42
"Some women are brought up to believe in traditional sex roles such as, "The man
is the boss of the house," or "The man will 'do, and you 'obey.' Women are also taught
that 'Good Girls don't make trouble,' and that 'Good wives are supposed to be able to
make the marriage work."' Id. (citing BARBARA CORRY, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A RECOVERY RESOURCE FOR BATTERED WOMEN AND THOSE WHO WORK WITH
THEM (1993)).
43 BAR ASSOCIATION,supra note 41 (citing BARBARA CORRY, UNDERSTANDING DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE: A RECOVERY RESOURCE FOR BATTERED WOMEN AND THOSE WHO WORK WITH
THEM (1993)).
4 4 Dutton, supra note 39, at 1234.
451d. at 1236-37.
461d. at 1237.
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may be seen as 'outsiders'.. . She may view the legal system not as a
source of protection, but as a source of racial discrimination.
47
Furthermore, battered women's fear of retaliation once they leave abusive
relationships are well founded. Oftentimes, restraining orders and
anti-stalking legislation do little to assist women in remaining safe.48 "The
criminal law is replete with cases describing serious bodily injury and murder
committed by an abuser in response to a battered woman's flight."4 9 Retaliation
for disobedience may take the form of escalated physical abuse of the woman
or those close to her.50 Violence occurring once the woman has fled is termed
"separation assault" 51 Batterers pursue battered women in an attempt to
reconcile or to seek revenge for leaving. 52 The batterer would rather kill or
commit suicide than face abandonment. The story of Patricia Burns 53 is one
example of separation assault. Patricia was terrified that her husband would
follow through with his threats to kill her. After she received a restraining order,
she left her husband Clarence to stay with her family. "As his first week alone
wore on, Clarence became increasingly frantic. "54 He stalked Patricia and, one
afternoon, located her parked car. He hid in the trunk and Patricia drove away
without knowing of the impending danger. Patricia was shot in the face five
times as she exited her car. She lay dead outside her family's home.55
D. Health Implications of Battered Women Syndrome
Domestic violence is considered a major health problem in our society.56
Because of the learned nature of violence,57 some commentators refer to family
471d.
48 Davis &Kraham, supra note 39, at 1148-49.
491d. at 1147. Battered women who leave their abusers report elevated levels of abuse
and face an increased risk of homicide. Id.
50 Dutton, supra note 39 at 1232. An abuser may seek to hurt the battered woman's
children, other family members or her close friends. He may also engage in destruction
of her property and harm her pets. Id. A battered woman may be aware of previous
violent or aggressive behavior by her batterer which makes her even more frightened.
For instance, she may know he previously committed a homicide or a rape. Id. at 1233.
51Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of
Separation, 90 MICH. L. REv. 1 (1991).
52Davis &Kraham, supra note 39, at 1146-47.
53 Patricia Burns was an elementary school teacher in Denver, Colorado. Her story is
depicted in WALKER, TERRYING LovE, supra note 10, at 66-69.
54 Id. at 66.
551d. at 67.
56 Hyman, supra note 2.
57 Many batterers typically come from abusive households. Children who were
victims of abuse themselves or witnessed abuse, are more likely than others to become
1997-98]
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violence as a "generic disease transmitted from one generation to the next.' 58
Others describe it as "a cancer growing in our nation's homes."59 Sadly, "[iun
1992, a congressional report indicated that the most dangerous place in the
United States for a woman to be is in her own home."60 The Journal of the
American Medical Association ("JAMA") indicated that domestic violence is
the leading cause of injury for women ages fifteen to forty-four.61 The National
Coalition Against Domestic Violence reports that a women is abused in the
United States every fifteen seconds. JAMA reports that its figure of two million
women abused annually is likely underestimated by two million.62
Physical abuse ranges from shoving, slapping, punching, kicking and
choking, to stabbings, shootings and forced sexual assaults. 63 The injuries are
numerous and varied. Examples include broken bones, internal bleeding,
bruising, concussions and gunshot wounds.64 In addition to the immediate
effects suffered by battered women, a number of chronic ailments are tied to
such abuse. Women commonly experience chest pains, headaches, prolonged
back pain,65 arthritis, hypertension 66 and other long term effects specific to
their injuries. Permanent injuries such as scars, loss of hearing or vision and
damage to joints also impact a battered woman's well-being.67
batterers. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 38.
58 Douglas D. Scherer, Tort Remedies for Victims of Domestic Abuse, 43 S.C. L. REv. 543,
574 n.62 (1992).
59 Renee M. Yoshimura, Empowering Battered Women: Changes in Domestic Violence
Laws in Hawaii, 17 U. HAw. L. REv. 575,577 (1995).
60 Linda L. Ammons, Discretionary Justice: A Legal and Policy Analysis of a Governor's
Use of the Clemency Power in the Cases of Incarcerated Battered Women, 3 J.L. &POL'Y 1, 5
[hereinafter Ammons, Clemency].
6 11d. at 6-7 (citing Antonia Novello, From the Surgeon General U.S. Public Health
Services, 267 JAMA 3132 (1992) but noting that there is some debate over the accuracy
of these statistics.) However, as with the incidents of rape, domestic violence is largely
underreported. Ammons, Clemency, supra note 60, at 7 (citations omitted).
6 2 Ammons, Clemency, supra note 60, at 6 (citations omitted).
6 3 Mary Ann Dutton, The Dynamics of Domestic Violence: Understanding the Response
From Battered Women, 68 FLA. B.J. 24 (1994).
6 4 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 79.
65See Diana K. Sugg, Study Ties Abuse to Host of Ailments, BALTIMORE SUN, Nov. 15,
1995, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Cumws file.
6 6 Violence Against Women: Relevance for Medical Practitioners (Report from the American
Medical Association's Council on Scientific Affairs), 267 JAMA 3184 (1992), available in
Westlaw, 1992 WL 11637484 [hereinafter Report].
6 7 1d.
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Psychological effects are equally egregious. Battered women syndrome is
included in the diagnostic category of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder.68
Established by the American Psychiatric Association,69 post-traumatic stress
disorder is "recognized as a normal reaction to an abnormal amount of stress.' 70
The health effects of battered women syndrome are similar to others who suffer
traumatic incidents, 71 yet their effects are sometimes exacerbated by the "fact
that the aggressor is someone they may love, trust, and depend on."72 Women
suffering from battered women syndrome are often depressed and fatigued. 73
They experience a loss of appetite, sleep disorders and extreme anxiety.74
Trauma of this type alters women's cognitive abilities, their memory and their
judgment.75 Suicide attempts and alcohol and drug abuse are responses which
sometimes stem from prolonged exposure to battering incidents. 76
II. BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME IN THE CRIMINAL CONTEXT
Under some circumstances, crimes such as murder or attempted murder, are
considered justifiable or excusable by society. For example, the use of force
toward another is justifiable when a person believes that such force is necessary
to protect herself against what she perceives as imminent danger of serious
bodily harm or death77 This is commonly known as self-defense. 78 In other
situations, a person is not guilty of otherwise criminal acts if she commits the
6 8 LEONARD KARP &CHERYL L. KARP, DOMESrIC TORTS: FAMILY VIOLENCE, CONFLICT
AND SEXUAL ABUSE § 1.14,1.14A (1989 &Supp. 1992) [hereinafter KARP, DOMESTIC TORTS]
(citing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM III and DSM
III-R) (3d ed. 1987)).
69Report, supra note 66, at *16, fn 48.
70Ammons, Racial Imagery &Stereotypes, supra note 14, at 1008-09.
71Post-traumatic stress disorder is also observed in combat veterans, rape victims
and people who witness the violent loss of a loved one. Id. at 1009-10.
72Report, supra note 66, at *6.
73 Not every battered women suffers from battered women syndrome. KARP,
DOMESTIC TORTS, supra note 68, § 1.14 at 25.
74 Scherer, supra note 58, at 553.
75Walker, Understanding BWS, supra note 4, at *4.
76See Anne H. Filtcraft, Violence, Values, and Gender, 267 JAMA 3194 (1992), available
on Westlaw, 1992 WL11637486; Report, supra note 66, at *7; Sugg, supra note 65, at lA.
77Schoop, supra note 15, at 49-50 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AusnIN W. ScoTr, JR.,
CRIMINAL LAW § 5.7 (2d ed. 1986)).
78 The Model Penal Code's definition of self defense is as follows:
(1) Use of Force Justifiable for Protection of the Person. Subject to the pro-
visions of this Section and of Section 3.09, the use of force upon or
toward another person is justifiable when the actor believes that
such force is immediately necessary for the purpose of protecting
himself against the use of unlawful force by such other person on
the present occasion.
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act reasonably believing in a threat of imminent infliction of death or great
bodily harm. This is known as the excuse of duress.79 When these affirmative
defenses are accepted, criminal penalties are not warranted.
A. Self-Defense and Expert Testimony on Battered Women Syndrome
In the late 1970's, lawyers began petitioning courts to allow Lenore Walker's
testimony on battered women syndrome.80 It was "no coincidence' 81 that the
introduction of this testimony paralleled the "growth of the women's
movement"82 which "began putting labels like 'battering' and 'marital rape' on
behaviors that, only a few years before, went unstudied and undiscussed in
academic circles."83 Yet courts were often reluctant to admit such testimony
believing it did not meet the requirements for introducing expert testimony at
trial.8 4
MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1994).
79Many states follow the Model Penal Code's definition of the duress defense.
Christine Emerson, Note, United States v. Willis: No Room for the Battered Woman Syndrome
in the Fifth Circuit?, 48 BAYLOR L. REv. 317,325-26 (1996). The Model Penal Code defines
duress as follows:
(1) It is an affirmative defense that the actor engaged in the conduct
charged to constitute an offense because he was coerced to do so by
the use of, or a threat to use, unlawful force against his person or
the person of another, which a person of reasonable firmness in his
situation would have been unable to resist.
(2) The defense provided by this Section is unavailable if the actor
recklessly placed himself in a situation in which it was probable that
he would be subjected to duress. The defense is also unavailable if
he was negligent in placing himself in such a situation, whenever
negligence suffices to establish culpability for the offense charged.
(3) It is not a defense that a woman acted on the command of her
husband, unless she acted under such coercion as would establish a
defense under this Section. [The presumption that a woman acting
in the presence of her husband is coerced is abolished.]
(4) When the conduct of the actor would otherwise be justifiable under
Section 3.02, this Section does not preclude such a defense.
MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.09 (1994).
80Ammons, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes, supra note 14, at 1014.
81Erich D. Andersen and Anne Read-Andersen, Constitutional Dimensions of the
Battered Woman Syndrome, 53 OHIo ST. L.J. 363, 374 (1992).
8 2 WALKER, THE BATrERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at ix.
8 3 Andersen, supra note 81, at 374.
84See State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984) for a comprehensive discussion of the
requirements for admissibility of expert-testimony on battered women syndrome.
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Each jurisdiction has its own criterion for admitting expert testimony;85 but,
the requirements are generally analyzed under the test in Dyas v. United States,86
in which courts ask whether:
(1) the subject matter must be 'so distinctively related to some science,
profession, business or occupation as to be beyond the ken of the
average layman'; (2) 'the witness must have sufficient skill,
knowledge, or experience in that field or calling as to make it appear
that his opinion or interference will probably aid the trier of fact in his
search for truth'; and (3) expert testimony is inadmissible if 'the state
of the pertinent art or scientific knowledge does not permit a
reason able opinion to be asserted even by an expert.'8 7
The third prong of this test, commonly referred to as the Frye "general
acceptance test," was used to determine the "admissibility of novel scientific
evidence at trial."88 In short, Frye held that the evidence proffered must be
"sufficiently established to have gained general acceptance by the particular
field to which it belongs."89
In 1993, the U.S. Supreme Court retreated from this stringent requirement in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,90 and held that
'[gleneral acceptance' is not a necessary precondition to the
admissibility of scientific evidence under the Federal Rules of
Evidence, but the Rules of Evidence-- especially Rule 702- do assign
to the trial judge the task of ensuring that an expert's testimony both
rests on a reliable foundation and is relevant to the task at hand.
Pertinent evidence based on scientifically valid principles will satisfy
those demands.
91
85See Janet Parrish, Trend Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in
Criminal Cases, 11 WIs. WOMEN's L.J. 75 (1996) (providing an in-depth analysis of the
admissibility of expert testimony on battering across the United States).
86376 A.2d 827 (D.C.), cert denied, 434 U.S. 973 (1977).
871d. at 832 (quoting MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 13, at 29-31 (Edward W. Cleary ed.,
2d ed. 1972)).
88Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 585 (1993).
89Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013, 1014 (1923).
90509 U.S. 579 (1993).
911d. at 595. This decision was based on Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Admissibility is further considered in light of Rules 401 and 402 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence which weigh the probative value of the testimony against the prejudicial effect
it may have on the trier of fact. Developments in the Law: Legal Responses to Domestic
Violence, Battered Women Who Kill Their Abusers 106 HARv. L. REV. 1574, 1583 (1993).
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In the context of battered women syndrome, it was not until 1979 that expert
testimony was considered admissible. The landmark case, Ibn-Tamas v. United
States,92 recognized that the probative value of expert testimony on battered
women syndrome was not outweighed by its prejudicial impact. The court
further held that this testimony would not invade the province of the jury.93
This case involved the trial court's failure to admit Dr. Walker's testimony to
support defendant Beverly Ibn-Tamas' claim of self-defense to a charge of
second degree murder. The D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals held that "[b]ecause
Dr. Walker's testimony was central to the defense theory of the case, we cannot
conclude, as a matter of law, that the trial court's exclusion of this testimony, if
ultimately in error, was harmless."94 The appellate court remanded the case to
the trial court for a determination of the admissibility of expert testimony on
battered women syndrome. 95 Although Ibn-Tamas' conviction was not
overturned on remand, the appellate decision "signaled to litigants and
advocates that the federal courts might consider battered women syndrome
testimony admissible. ' 96
The New Jersey Supreme Court in State v. Kelly, offered battered women a
stronger advocacy for the admission of expert testimony. In one of the "seminal
decisions addressing this issue,' 97 the court stated:
The difficulty with the expert's testimony is that it sounds as if an
expert is giving knowledge to a jury about something the jury knows
as well as anyone else, namely, the reasonableness of a person's fear of
imminent serious danger. That is not at all, however, what this
testimony is directly aimed at. It is aimed at an area where the
purported common knowledge of the jury may be very much
mistaken, an area where jurors' logic, drawn from their own
experience, may lead to a wholly incorrect conclusion, an area where
expert knowledge would enable the jurors to disregard their prior
conclusions as being common myths rather than common knowledge.
After hearing the expert, instead of saying [defendant] Kelly could not
have been beaten up so badly for if she had, she certainly would have
left, the jury could conclude that her failure to leave was very much
part and parcel of her life as a battered wife. The jury could conclude
that instead of casting doubt on the accuracy of her testimony about
92407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979).
931d. at 639.
94Id. at 640.
95 Despite the court's ruling "that the probative value of this expert testimony would
outweigh the risk of engender[ing] vindictive passions within the jury or... confus[ing]
the issues," the record was inadequate to determine whether the testimony was
admissible. Id. at 639.
96 Ammons, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes, supra note 14, at 1014-15.
97 Boland, supra note 10, at 618.
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the severity and frequency of prior beatings, her failure to leave
actually reinforced her credibility.
98
Although courts today widely accept expert testimony on battered woman
syndrome in traditional confrontational cases, admission of testimony is
slightly more problematic in cases which the woman kills her batterer when he
lay sleeping on the couch or watching television. 99 In this situation, the
"imminence" requirement of a self-defense claim is sometimes thought to be
lacking.100 In other words, the woman is not considered to be in immediate
danger of bodily harm because the batterer is not currently beating her and
thus, the "justification" for the killing is not valid. For instance, in People v.
Aris,101 the trial court excluded expert testimony of battered women syndrome
to prove self-defense. The defendant, Mrs. Aris was subjected to continuous
beatings during the course of her ten year marriage. Mrs. Aris testified that on
the night of the killing, her husband beat her and stated he would not let her
live until the morning.102 She feared that when her husband woke up he would
"hurt [her] very badly or even kill [her]."103 Mrs. Aris shot her husband five
times while he lay sleeping on the couch because she felt she "had to do it."104
The California Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's conviction of
second-degree murder.105 The court held that it was harmless error to exclude
expert testimony as to how the defendant's experiences as a battered woman
affected her perceptions of danger and its imminence..106 Furthermore, the
court determined that "the testimony was irrelevant and inadmissible on the
issue of the objective reasonableness of the defendant's actions."107
Testimony on battered women syndrome is generally used to explain the
circumstances surrounding the crime committed by the abused woman. For
instance, self-defense claims involve three crucial elements: (1) the defendant's
98 State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364, 378 (N.J. 1984).
99 Anderson, supra note 81, at 381; See also Parrish, supra note 85, at 84 (Summarizing
various findings regarding the types of cases in which expert testimony is admitted and
concluding that "[e]xpert testimony on battering and its effects is most readily accepted
by state courts in cases involving traditional self-defense situations." Parrish's research
indicated that 90 percent of the States admitted expert testimony in traditional
self-defense cases and 29 percent of the States admitted expert testimony in
non-traditional situations.)
100 Anderson, supra note 81, at 381.
101264 Cal. Rptr. 167 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).
102 1d. at 171.
1031d.
104Id.
105Aris, 264 Cal. Rptr. at 180.
1061d.
107 Anderson, supra note 81, at 383.
1997-981
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
reasonable belief that she was in danger of harm; (2) the imminence of death
or bodily harm; and (3) the amount of force used.108 Evidence of battering helps
the jury to understand the woman's particular experiences with her batterer in
relation to these elements. Elizabeth Schneider, a Professor at Brooklyn Law
School who has explored gender-bias in the criminal law, specifically focusing
on battered women,109 states that:
Evidence of battering is crucial in dispelling myths and
misconceptions commonly held by jurors about battered women, and
helping jurors to understand the experiences of battered women as
they are relevant to woman's understanding of the level of danger they
are in and their reactions to the perceived danger. In other words,
evidence of battering in a self-defense case is not relevant insofar as it
attempts to justify killing in and of itself. It is relevant because it helps
the jury to understand the woman's particular experiences with her
batterer. It gives the jury insight about the development of her
heightened ability to sense that she was in grave danger at the time of
the killing. It provides the jury with the appropriate context in which
to decide whether her apprehension of imminent danger of death or
great bodily harm was reasonable.
110
For example, if a batterer is killed while passed out in his bed, jurors may
question the "imminence" or immediate threat posed by the batterer. Yet the
testimony helps jurors comprehend how the battered woman reasonably
believed she was in extreme danger.1" Evidence of battering also helps the jury
understand why the defendant chose to use force against her abuser rather than
leave the relationship.112 Jurors learn about the psychological paralysis which
overcomes an abused woman and how a woman "supposedly so 'passive' that
she was unable to leave the relationship would find the wherewithal to rise up
and kill her batterer."11 3 Additionally, such evidence bolsters the defendant's
credibility with the jury by helping to account for "perceived inconsistencies"
in her story."14 This expert testimony would presumably have helped Mrs. Aris
in her claim of self-defense.
108See Boland, supra note 10, at 612-13; Walker, BWS and Self-Defense, supra note 17, at
324-26.
109See Schneider, supra note 10, at 524 nn. 4,5,6 (listing Schneider's experience in the
area of domestic violence and citing several articles she authored on the subject).
1101d. at 511 (citations omitted).
1 11For a discussion on imminence, see Richard A. Rosen, On Self-Defense, Imminence,
and Women Who Kill Their Batterers, 71 N.C. L. REv. 371 (1993); B. Sharon Byrd, Till Death
Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach To Justifying Lethal Self-Defense By Battered
Women, 1991 DuKE J. COMP. &INTL L. 169, 206 (1991).
112Boland, supra note 10, at 615-16.
1131d. at 616.
1141d.
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B. Battered Women Syndrome as a "Special" Defense
Although there is no recognized "battered women syndrome" defense, 115
some legal scholars argue for a separate identifiable defense.116 The defense is
based on Lenore Walker's work which illustrates that the symptoms of battered
women syndrome are specific to victims of domestic abuse.11 7 Lenore Walker
states this is a "new view on an old defense."'1 8 It is introduced to the judge
and jury to demonstrate that 'living in domestic violence has such a major
impact on a woman's state of mind that it could make an act of homicide
justifiable, even when the first look at the facts does not appear to be traditional
confrontational self-defense." 119 Courts have similarly asserted that there is an
affirmative defense of battered women syndrome. In 1992, for instance, the
Rhode Island Supreme Court suggested that battered woman syndrome might
be presented as an affirmative defense to murder.120
115Schneider, supra note 10, at 510.
116Elizabeth Schneider lists those who discuss this separate defense:
Claire 0. Finkelstein, Self-Defense as a Rational Excuse, 57 U. Prrr. L.
REV. 621, 631 (1996) ("excuse of battered woman syndrome"); Mira
Mihajlovich, Does Plight Make Right: The Battered Woman Syndrome,
Expert Testimony and the Law of Self-Defense, 62 IND. L.J. 1253 (1987)
('battered woman syndrome defense" should be diminished capacity);
Elizabeth Vaughan &Maureen L. Moore, The Battered Spouse Defense
in Kentucky, 10 N. KY. L. REV. 399 (1983) ("battered woman defense" is
emerging "as akin to, but separate from, the more familiar and estab-
lished defenses of self-defense and diminished capacity").
Schneider, supra note 10, at 524 n. 131.
1 17 WALKER, THE BArrERED WOMAN, supra note 2.
118Walker, BWS and Self-Defense, supra note 17, at 321.
1191d. Non-traditional self-defense cases include instances where the man is not
engaged in beating the women at the time she commits the murder. In such cases, the
man may be sleeping or resting. Id.
12OMcMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725, 733-34 (R.I. 1992) (recognizing that the condition
of battered women syndrome has "certain legal consequences" and that the defendant
has the burden of proving "the existence of facts that would constitute the
battered-woman's syndrome defense"). Accord State v. Vigil, 794 P.2d 728, 729 (N.M.
1990) (referring to a "battered woman theory of self-defense"); Commonwealth v. Tyson,
526 A.2d 395 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987) (referring to the "defense of 'battered woman's
syndrome"'); Moran v. Ohio, 105 S. Ct. 350,351 (1984) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations
omitted). Justices Brennan and Marshall, dissenting from a denial of certiorari on an
appeal of a convicted battered woman asserting self-defense, stated that "[a]lthough
traditional self-defense theory may seem to fit the situation only imperfectly, the
battered woman's syndrome [is] a self-defense theory that has gained increasing
support over recent years." But see Hawthorne v. State, 408 So. 2d 801,805 (Fla. Dist. Ct.
App. 1982) (battered woman syndrome testimony is introduced to understand a claim
of self-defense and not to establish a novel defense); State v. Stewart, 763 P.2d 572, 577
(Kan. 1988) ("[N]o jurisdictions have held that the existence of the battered woman
syndrome in and of itself operates as a defense to murder").
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Anne M. Coughlin, an Assistant Professor at Vanderbilt Law School,
acknowledges the existence of a "battered woman syndrome defense" yet
believes the theory, as presently endorsed, is inadequate. 121 Coughlin asserts
that" [tIhe defense itself defines the woman as a collection of mental symptoms,
motivational deficits, and behavioral abnormalities; indeed, the fundamental
premise of the defense is that women lack the psychological capacity to choose
lawful means to extricate themselves from abusive mates. 122 Despite
Coughlin's recognition of the "special" excuse for women, she argues that it is
anti-feminist and "inadequate" because the defense "rests on and reaffirms this
invidious understanding of women's incapacity for rational self-control ...
[and it] denies that women have the same capacity for self-governance that is
attributed to men."123 She concludes that the present model of responsibility
under the criminal law should be revised to include characteristics traditionally
associated with and internalized by women.124 This would excuse women
without judging them "to be deviant from and inferior to the model human
actor the [which the] theory [currently] describes."125
Elizabeth Schneider strongly advises against the idea of a separate defense
of battered woman syndrome. She believes some courts are "confused" by the
relevance of evidence of battering and others employ a " 'hybrid'" defense. 126
Others caution that "one must be careful not to imply that the 'syndrome' is
actually a separate defense, rather than merely a tool by which to interpret
evidence presented in support of such traditional defenses as self-defense." 127
121 Anne M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 CALIF. L. REv. 1 (1994).
1221d. at 7.
123 Id. at 6.
124 For example, instead of suggesting that women remain in the abusive home
because of psychological paralysis, this theory would applaud women for remaining in
the "relationship out of a conviction that she has a responsibility to care for her troubled
spouse and to sustain the network of family life, especially to assure the welfare of her
children." Id. at 89. Coughlin also cites problems with this new theory and notes that
she continues to research in this area. Coughlin, supra note 121, at 90-92.
125 1d. at 92.
126Schneider, supra note 10, at 511-12 (citing Banks v. State, 608 A.2d 1249, 1252 (Md.
Ct. Spec. App. 1992)). Schneider further states that
[b]attered woman's advocates have not asked for or claimed any 'special'
or separate defense for battered women defendants. Legislation and appli-
cation of what may appear to be a separate defense are the result of well-
intentioned but misguided attempts by legislators, judges, and attorneys to
grapple with the problem of women's unequal access to justice.
Schneider, supra note 10, at 524 n.139.
127Boland, supra note 10, at 635 n.5. See also Sue Osthoff, Preface to Janet Parrish, Trend
Analysis: Expert Testimony on Battering and its Effects in Criminal Cases, 11 WIS. WOMEN'S
L.J. 75 (1996). Osthoff, Director of the National Clearinghouse for the Defense of Battered
Women, fears that instead of educating lay persons about battered women, a special
defense "misconstrue[s] the use of the evidence of abuse in criminal trials, and since the
Bobbitt & Menendez trials, there has been increased publicity decrying the so-called
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Recognition of a separate defense may result in a stereotype of women
suffering from battered women syndrome and consequently, those who are not
thought to fit the stereotype, may not be afforded the same protections as
women who do.12 8
C. Evidence of Battered Women Syndrome in Other Criminal Cases
Using evidence of battered women syndrome to support defenses of duress
or coercion are even more challenging than asserting self-defense. This
affirmative defense excuses criminal acts when the defendant, under an
unlawful threat of serious bodily harm, commits a crime in response to that
threat. 129 For instance, a battered woman may commit robbery, murder or drug
offenses in accordance with the wishes of her batterer. In her defense, she
introduces expert testimony that she suffers from battered women syndrome,
essentially claiming that because she was subjected to repeated abuse, she was
unable to resist the abuser's commands. In the defendant's mind, she was in
extreme, imminent danger and had no choice but to commit the criminal act. 13 0
Those who advocate use of battered women syndrome in duress equate it to
self-defense situations1 31 and argue that evidence of battered women
syndrome is likewise appropriate to educate and guide the jury. An example
of a court acknowledging the relevance of battered woman syndrome in a
duress case is illustrated in People v. Romero, 132 where the California Court of
Appeals vacated a lower court's robbery conviction because the defense
attomeyfailed to introduce evidence of battered women syndrome. 133 The
evidence indicated that the defendant, Debra Romero, was ordered to get
money to support her husband's cocaine habit and that if she did not comply
'abuse excuses' as condoning vigilantism and freeing people who kill from personal
responsibility." Id. at 79.
128Schneider, supra note 10, at 497-99.
129 Boland, supra note 10, at 623.
1301d. at 625.
13 1 See Id. at 623-35; Emerson, supra note 79, at 328-30.
13226 Cal. App. 4th 315 (1992), review granted, 846 P.2d 702 (Cal. 1993) (limited to
question of whether writ of habeas corpus should issue).
133The court determined this failure constituted ineffective assistance of counsel. Id.
at 318. Other courts have also recognized the validity of battered women syndrome in
the context of coercion or duress. See McMaugh v. State, 612 A.2d 725 (R.I. 1992)
(recognizing the battered woman syndrome as a means of establishing coercion and
granting post-conviction relief to defendant convicted of first-degree murder,
conspiracy and carrying a pistol without a license); United States v. Homick, 964 F.2d
899, 905 (9th Cir. 1992) (addressing a coercion-based defense and holding "the unique
nature of battered woman syndrome justifies a somewhat different approach to the way
we have historically applied these principles"); But see United States v. Willis, 38 F.3d
170 (5th Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 2585 (1995) (holding that expert testimony
regarding the battered woman syndrome is irrelevant to a defendant's duress claim).
1997-98]
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
with his orders, she was subjected to repeated threats and violent behavior.134
The court determined that such testimony was especially important to explain
how her behavior is not inconsistent with her status as a battered woman. 135
As in the cases of self-defense, expert testimony seems particularly helpful in
duress cases to present jurors with facts and information necessary to prevent
the mistaken belief that "they can interpret the facts by using their own
background and experience."136
III. DOMESTC VIOLENCE IN CIVIL LmGATION
A. Traditional Tort Actions Involving Domestic Abuse
Improvements in the criminal justice system's responses to domestic
violence as well as legislation aimed at violence prevention 137 illustrate the
importance of battered women's plight for assistance. 138 Because the incidents
of domestic violence are at epidemic levels and society recognizes the
seriousness of the problem, the civil side of the law is also responding. A new
trend in civil litigation, the filing of domestic torts is quickly emerging.1 39 In
fact, "[m]ost interspousal tort suits involve domestic violence situations. " 140
The abrogation of interspousal tort immunity in many jurisdictions has helped
contribute to the development of domestic tort law.14 1 Redress is now available
for many victims of domestic abuse who suffered through years of living in
terror and experiencing what some term "torture" and a violation of women's
134Romero, 26 Cal. App. 4th at 319.
135Id. at 329-30.
136 Boland, supra note 10, at 635.
137Violence protection refers to civil protection orders. "Civil protection orders are
one of the more traditional state responses to the historic inability of the criminal justice
system to handle the problem of domestic violence." Edward S. Snyder, Remedies for
Domestic Violence:A Continuing Challenge, 12J. AM. ACAD. MATRIM. LAw. 335,344 (1994).
Ideally, a civil protection order operates to prevent any contact between the abuser and
the victim. Id. Many states have also enacted stalking statutes in response to the growing
concern for the safety of domestic violence victims. See Susan E. Bernstein, Living Under
Siege: Do Stalking Laws Protect Domestic Violence Victims?, 15 CARDOZO L. REv. 525 (1993);
Laurie Salame, A National Survey of Stalking Laws: A Legislative Trend Comes to the Aid of
Domestic Violence Victims and Others, 27 Surou U. L. REv. 67 (1993).
138Scherer, supra note 58, at 552.
139Fredrica L Lehrman, Elements of Interpersonal Domestic Violence Torts: Bringing
Traditional Actions, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, Dec./Jan. 1996 at 3 [hereinafter
Lehrman, Traditional Actions].
140Leonard Karp &Cheryl L. Karp, Beyond the Normal Ebb and Flow ... Infliction of
Emotional Distress in Domestic Violence Cases, 28 FAM. L.Q. 389, 398 (1994) 1hereinafter
Karp, Intentional Infliction].
141Snyder, supra note 137, at 354.
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human rights.142 As tort law develops, many victims of domestic abuse are
afforded the same remedies as victims of abuse perpetrated by complete
strangers.
Tort law is a vehicle of redress for harms such as physical injury, mental
distress and damage to property.143 Professor William L. Prosser defines a tort
as:
a civil wrong, other than a breach of contract, for which the law
provides a remedy This area of law imposes duties on persons to act
in a manner that will not injure other persons. A person who breaches
a tort duty has committed a tort and may be liable in a lawsuit brought
by a person injured because of that tort.144
In traditional tort law, as well as domestic torts suits, the basis for the action
includes: (1) a duty; (2) a breach of that duty which; (3) proximately causes; (4)
a harm or injury.145 The most common and the most useful domestic torts are
assault and battery.146 Other common claims include intentional or reckless
infliction of emotional distress and wrongful death.147
Because tort actions should only be pursued if financial damages are
available, 148 some might question the importance of this avenue, falsely
assuming that civil suits will do little to help battered women. This is a product
of the myth that battered women are predominately found in low income
levels. However, "research clearly shows that verbal abuse, minor physical
abuse, and severe physical assault occur at all socioeconomic levels."149 Lenore
Walker debunked the myth that middle and upper class women do not
experience battering as often or as violently as do poor women. Walker found
that many battered women "are highly competent workers and successful
14 2 Rhonda Copelon, Recognizing the Egregious in the Everyday: Domestic Violence as
Torture, 25COLUM. HUM. RTs. L. REv. 291,295 (1994) (arguing for recognition of domestic
violence as among "the most heinous human rights violations"). Id. at 367.
14 3 VINCENT R. JOHNSON &ALAN GuNN, STUDIES IN AMERICAN TORT LAW 1 (1994).
14 4 PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, at 1.
145 Lehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 3.
146 See Daniel T. Barker, Note, Interspousal Immunity and Domestic Torts: A New Twist
on the 'War of the Roses,' 15 AM. J. TRIAL- ADvoc. 625, 626 (1992); Lehrman, Traditional
Actions, supra note 139, at 3; Scherer, supra note 58, at 555.
14 7 Lehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 3.
14 8 Because domestic torts are expensive to litigate and are emotionally difficult, "[a]
personal injury or domestic tort claim should not be considered unless there is a source
of recovery ... [which] may come from the perpetrator if he has a substantial estate,
insurance coverage for the tortfeasor, or third parties also legally responsible for the
damages." Leonard Karp, Civil Relieffor Victims of'Uncivilized Behavior,' FAM. ADVOC.,
Winter, 1995, at 77-78 [hereinafter Karp, Civil Relief]. Such claims are also helpful in
leverage during divorce negotiations. Lehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 3.
149 Scherer, supra note 58, at 548.
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career women... found in all age groups, races, ethnic and religious groups,
educational levels, and socioeconomic groups.' 150
Thus, although tort remedies cannot directly help poor women because their
abusive partners probably do not have the monetary resources to satisfy a
judgment, it is not fruitless to pursue tort litigation on behalf of all battered
women. The availability of tort remedies "is an extremely important
development from the point of view of abuse victims who may find that a tort
claim is the only available way to attain the requisite financial wholeness and
independence which is needed to make a fresh start at life.' 151 For example, an
abused woman may be a product of a middle-class relationship yet she is a
homemaker and may have difficulty finding a job to support herself and her
children. In this case, the batterer, a middle-class man, does have the means to
satisfy a judgment against himself and the battered woman would gain a better
chance to live on her own and escape the violence. Additionally, although
women in lower socioeconomic levels may not directly benefit from civil
action, increased litigation in this area will bring greater public awareness,
hopefully accompanied by increased funding and services for poor battered
women.
1. Assault and Battery
Assault and battery are intentional torts. This means that the actor either
purposefully created the particular result or had substantial knowledge that
such a result would follow. 152 Assault is defined as the intent to create a
well-grounded apprehension of imminent, unconsented, bodily contact 153
150 WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN, supra note 2, at 18-19. Recent examples of
domestic violence affecting middle and upper-class families include Joel Steinberg and
Hedda Nussbaum, a middle-class, Jewish couple living in a Greenwich Village
brownstone. Martha Minow, Words and the Door to the Land of Change: Law, Language,
and Family Violence, 43 VAND. L. REv. 1665,1678 (1990). Steinberg, a lawyer, was found
guilty of manslaughter in the death of Lisa Steinberg, his six year old illegally adopted
daughter. People v. Steinberg, 595 N.E.2d 845-46 (1992). Nussbaum was also battered
by Steinberg yet there were questions regarding Nussbaum's failure to prevent Lisa's
death. Minow, supra at 1699 n.89. In exchange for testimony against her lover,
Nussbaum "was never charged and was given the psychiatric and social services
support she needed." Ammons, Racial Imagery and Stereotypes, supra note 14, at 1020.
Other examples include, John Fedders, a high-ranking official of the Securities and
Exchange Commission charged with abusing his wife, Charlotte Fedders. Lisa R. Eskow,
Note, The Ultimate Weapon?: Demythologizing Spousal Rape and Reconceptualizing its
Prosecution, 48 STAN. L. REv. 677,709 n.181 (1996). Recently, and equally infuriating, O.J.
Simpson, a former football player, actor, and sports commentator, was acquitted of
charges that he murdered his former wife, Nicole Brown Simpson, and her friend
Ronald Goldman. Ammons, Clemency, supra note 60, at 79 n.20. The trial was replete
with allegations of domestic abuse directed at Nicole Brown Simpson. Nicole's bruised
face was a common image on television screens across the nation.
151Snyder, supra note 137, at 354.
152JoHNSON, supra note 143, at 35.
15 3 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTs § 21 (1) (a)-(b) (1965).
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while a battery is defined as the intentional, unconsented, harmful or offensive
touching of another.154
In battery actions, the conduct complained of must be harmful or offensive
and a reasonable person standard is used to judge the validity of such claims. 155
The tort of battery can be committed directly or indirectly.156 Thus, an action
lies regardless of whether a batterer hits a woman in the face with his hand or
breaks a glass against a wall which ultimately strikes the woman. All that is
necessary is that the batterer affirmatively put an object in force which results
in the harmful touching. Battery covers any part of the body or anything
connected with it such that snatching an object from the victim's person is also
considered tortious.157 Finally, the plaintiff does not need to be aware of the
harm or contact at the precise moment the battery occurs. The contact is
considered harmful if it results in pain or illness or if there is "any physical
impairment of the condition of another's body. 158
Assault and battery are often used interchangeably in a criminal setting "to
denote the unconsented infliction of bodily harm" 159 yet they are distinct tort
causes of action. An assault can occur without the existence of a battery if the
perpetrator "desists before the blow is struck. " 160 Likewise, a battery can occur
without an assault if the victim is not aware that a perpetrator is preparing to
strike a blow.16 1 Thus, for the tort of assault, the plaintiff must be cognizant of
a potential harm and that the perpetrator must have the ability to cause the
contact. The plaintiff does not however, need to be placed in fear. 162 It is enough
that the plaintiff understands the imminence of the contact. However, threats
of future harm do not constitute an assault because the imminence element is
not satisfied. 163 Words alone are not enough to support a claim of assault. The
words usually must be accompanied by a threatening gesture.164 Likewise, no
154Id. § 13 (a).
1551d. § 19.
1561d. § 18 cmt. c.
157See, e.g., JOHNsON, supra note 143, at 56-57 (citing Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel,
Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967)).
158RESTArTEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 15.
15 9JoHNsON, supra note 143, at 53.
16 01d. at 52.
1611d.
162 RTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 24 cmt. b.
163 According to the Restatement: 'The apprehension created must be one of imminent
contact, as distinguished from any contact in the future. 'Imminent' does not mean
immediate, in the sense of instantaneous contact... [ilt means rather that there will be
no significant delay." Id. § 29 cmt. b.
16 4JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 64.
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assault occurs if the plaintiff learns much later that the defendant had
previously pointed a gun at her back.165
Both assault and battery afford victims compensatory, punitive, and nominal
damages. 166 Physical injury and emotional pain and suffering are damages
caused by a battery while "mental disturbance, including fright, humiliation
and the like, as well as any physical illness which may result from them" are
damages typically caused by an assault.167
2. Intentional or Reckless Infliction of Emotional Distress
The Restatement (Second) of Torts imposes liability for damages on a person
who intentionally or recklessly, through extreme and outrageous conduct,
causes severe emotional distress to another.168 Intentional or reckless 169
165RESTATEMNT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 22.
166Compensatory damages represent an award for losses actually suffered.. Punitive
damages are imposed as a means of civil penalty and are available in cases of egregious
behavior. Nominal damages are symbolic victories. These are awarded when no losses
are established and typically "vindicate the plaintiff's technical right." JOHNSON, supra
note 143, at 55. Fredrica L. Lehrman cites several recent cases in which damages were
successfully recovered. These cases include:
Cater v. Cater, 846 S.W.2d 173 (Ark. 1993) (wife recovered $20,000
compensatory and $350,000 punitive damages for assault and battery
by husband); Sumrall v. Sumrall, 612 So. 2d 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1993)
(wife recovered $43,000 after husband beat her); Murray v. Murray,
598 So. 2d 921 (Ala. Civ. App. 1992) (wife recovered $5000 compensa-
tory and $50,000 punitive damages against husband who physically
abused her during marriage); Sielski v. Sielski, 604 A.2d 206 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1992) (wife recovered $1030 compensatory damages, $1000
for pain and suffering, and $5000 punitive damages); Catlett v. Catlett,
388 S.E.2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989) (wife recovered $20,000 punitive
damages against husband for assault, battery and false imprisonment);
Simmons v. Simmons, 773 P.2d 602 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988) (wife recovered
$15,000 compensatory and $100,000 punitive damages against husband
for assault, battery and outrageous conduct); Aubert v. Aubert, 529 A.2d
909 (N.H. 1987) (husband recovered $350,000 against wife who shot him
at close range; wife had been convicted of attempted murder); Duplechin
v. Toce, 497 So. 2d 763 (La. Ct. App. 1987) (wife recovered $52,000 for
battery, including scalp lacerations, broken nose, contusions and per-
forated eardrum). The 1994 decision in the Texas domestic violence
assault and battery case of O'Keiff v. Christ, No. 9228795-A (Dist. Ct. Tex.,
Apr. 6, 1994) (reported in Law Reporter 226 (Aug. 1994)), ended in a jury
award of $10.9 million in compensatory damages and $150 million in
punitive damages against a physician who shot and severely injured his
wife.
Lehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 3.
167PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, § 10, at 43.
168RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS at § 46 (1).
169Intentional infliction of emotional distress, like other intentional torts, requires the
element of knowledge. The tortfeasor either knew or was substantially certain that his
actions would result in injury to the plaintiff. "There are, however, a few cases which
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infliction of emotional distress, sometimes referred toas the "tort of outrage,"' 70
is a relatively recent judicial development. 171 Because of the difficulty of
proving damages and the fear that this claim would open the floodgates of
litigation for "mere bad manners" and fictitious claims, the courts were once
reluctant to recognize this action. 172 Recovery however, is not allowed for
insults, threats, abuse or hurt feelings. 173 The Restatement comments that:
Liability has been found only where the conduct has been so
outrageous in character, and so extreme in degree, as to go beyond all
possible bounds of decency, and to be regarded as atrocious, and
utterly intolerable in a civilized community. Generally, the case is one
in which the recitation of the facts to an average member of the
community would arouse his resentment against the actor, and lead
him to exclaim, "Outrageous!
" 174
Because of the concern about the genuineness of claims, jurisdictions initially
required some showing of physical injury to prove mental distress.175 Now,
however, courts generally permit this action without a showing of physical
injury 176 and allow recovery of both compensatory and punitive damages. 177
indicate that liability for extreme outrage is broader and extends to situations in which
there is no certainty, but merely a high degree of probability that the mental distress
will follow, and the defendant goes ahead in conscious disregard of it. This is the type
of conduct which commonly is called willful or wanton, or reckless." PROSSER &KEETON,
supra note 6, § 12, at 64.
170JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 66.
171Id.
1 72 PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, § 12, at 56.
1731d. § 12, at 59-60.
174RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORis § 46 cmt. d.
175 Examples of physical injury included heart attacks, miscarriages or some other
identifiable less severe physical illness. JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 68.
1761d. Fredrica L. Lehrman cites examples of cases in domestic violence tort actions
which did not require physical injury in emotional distress claims.
In Massey v. Massey, 807 S.W.2d 391 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991), aff'd, 867
S.W.2d 766 (Tex. 1993), the court affirmed a $362,000 jury award to a
wife who had to live 'walking on egg shells' to avoid her husband's
rage. This case made new law by allowing 'the tort of infliction of
emotional distress, without physical injury' to apply to family law
cases because to do otherwise would be to deny equal protection
to married persons. Another case not requiring physical injury
to fulfill the elements of this cause of action was Murphy v. Murphy,
486 N.Y.S.2d 457 (1985). (See generally, Twyman v. Twyman, 855
S.W.2d 619, 621-22 &ns. 2, 3 (Tex. 1993), listing cases from 43 states
that require no physical injury before liability may be established.)
Lehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 4.
177JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 92.
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However, the law concerning emotional distress cases is still in a process of
expansion and the cases that remain "easiest to prove usually involve spouses
who have been physically abused."178 Other possibilities for traditional tort
actions involving domestic abuse situations include false imprisonment,179
wrongful death180 and negligent infliction of emotional distress. 181
B. Non-Traditional Domestic Torts
Several other non-traditional actions exist which create alternatives to
common tort suits involving domestic violence. Fredrica L. Lehrman, 182 an
attorney practicing in the area of domestic violence and family law, considers
the following causes of action to constitute domestic violence torts: intentional
interference with custody, visitation and/or parent child relationship, parental
kidnapping; defamation, libel and slander; tortious infliction of a sexually
transmitted disease; marital rape; using the U.S. Mail to send threats across
state lines; invasion of privacy; and negligent operation of a motor vehicle. 183
Another commentator proposes liability for "the tortious interspousal
transmission or exposure to AIDS."184 Further, in light of the recent passage of
178Karp, Intentional Infliction, supra note 140, at 399. The authors categorize emotional
distress claims which lack physical injury as "tortious transmission of sexual diseases,
interference with custodial rights, and intolerable or atrocious conduct intended to cause
severe psychological harm to the spouse." Id.
179Lehrman, TraditionalActions, supra note 139, at 10 (citing Catlett v. Catlett, 388 S.E.
2d 14 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989); See also Karp, Civil Relief supra note 148, at 78.
18OLehrman, Traditional Actions, supra note 139, at 3 (citing Herget Nat'l Bank v.
Berardi, 356 N.E.2d 529 (Ill. 1976); Parman v. Price, No. 87-CP-08-287 (S.C. Beaufort
County Ct. CP Nove. 10, 1988); Hampdon v. Duda &Sons, Inc., 511 So. 2d 1104, 1107
(Fla. 1987)). See also Karp, Civil Relief, supra note 148, at 78.
181 Many states require physical injury for an action of negligent infliction of emotional
distress. Lehrman, TraditionalActions, supra note 139, at 10 (citing Ledger v. Tippitt, 210
Cal. Rptr. 814 (1995)). Negligent infliction of emotional distress imposes liability when
the tortfeasor's negligence creates "an unreasonable risk of bodily harm and emotional
disturbance." Lehrman, TraditionalActions, supra note 139, at 10 (citing W. PAGE KEETON
ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54 (5th ed. 1984)). Lerhman states
that attorneys "might plead negligent infliction in the alternative to an intentional tort
because most insurance policies do not cover intentional torts." Lehrman, Traditional
Actions, supra note 139, at 10. However, the disadvantage to pursuing this action is that
negligence judgments are dischargeable in bankruptcy and punitives are not available.
Id. See also Karp, Civil Relief, supra note 149, at 78.
182Lehrman is an attorney with Shaw, Pittman, Potts &Trowbride, 2300 N. Street,
Washington, D.C. 20037 and also writes for the bi-monthly publication of DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE REPORT.
183 Fredrica L. Lehrman, Elements of Interpersonal Domestic Violence Torts: Some
Non-Traditional Alternatives, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE REPORT, Feb./Mar. 1996, at 3-4
[hereinafter Lehrman, Non-Traditional].
184Robert B. Gainor, To Have and to Hold: The Tort Liability for the Interspousal
Transmission of AIDS, 23 NEW ENG. L. REv. 887 (1988/1989).
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the Violence Against Women's Act of 1994,185 the federal government now
affords a civil rights remedy to victims of gender-motivated crimes.186 This
allows successful plaintiffs to recover compensatory and punitive damages187
and it may be a viable cause of action in marital rape situations.188 Although
these suits are less common, they are no less important for battered women
who need every possible avenue open so that they are afforded full recovery.
C. Obstacles to Domestic Tort Suits
1. Interspousal Tort Immunity
Interspousal tort immunity is a defense to a civil cause of action between
husband and wife. The doctrine "prohibits one spouse from seeking tort
damages from the other."189 Because this was the majority rule until the 1970's,
many women were precluded from seeking money damages from abusive,
battering husbands. 190
The abrogation of spousal immunity in many jurisdictions is a recent
phenomenon.191 In fact, the doctrine is still alive in Georgia and Louisiana. 192
Traditionally, courts viewed tort actions against spouses as an interference with
"domestic harmony."193 Courts also feared such suits would encourage
fictitious and fraudulent actions. 194 Interspousal tort immunity has its roots
deep in the common law of England. The "most influential reason" underlying
the doctrine was the merger of the female's identity with the male's "upon
marriage."195 William Blackstone, in his Commentaries on the Laws of
England, stated " ' Ibly marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law;
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during the
185Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, 108
Stat. 1796, 1902 (codified in scattered titles of 42 U.S.C.).
18642 U.S.C. § 13981(b) (1994).
18742 U.S.C. 13981(c).
188Lehrman, Non-Traditional, supra note 183, at 4.
189Rhonda L. Kohler, Comment, The Battered Woman and Tort Law: A New Approach to
Fighting Domestic Violence, 25 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1025, 1037 (1992).
1901d.
191Clare Dalton, Domestic Violence, Domestic Torts and Divorce: Constraints and
Possibilities, 31 NEW ENG. L. REV. 319, 324 (1997) (listing states reluctant to abolish the
doctrine including Florida, Delaware, and Hawaii which did so in 1993).
1921d.
193Karp, Civil Relief, supra note 148, at 77.
194PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, § 122, at 902.
195Carl Tobias, Interspousal Tort Immunity In America, 23 GA. L. REv. 359, 363 (1989).
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marriage, or at least is incorporated and consolidated into that of her husband,
under whose wing, protection, and cover, she performs everything.' "196
The reluctance, even today, to abolish the doctrine is disturbing. Yet the cited
justifications include: (1) the preservation of domestic harmony; (2) the fear of
fraudulent or collusive claims; (3) the idea of deference to legislatures in
resolving the immunity debate; (4) the threat of "excessive and frivolous
claims;" and (5) the availability of adequate alternative remedies such as
divorces and criminal prosecutions.197 Despite these concerns, this common
law doctrine does not preserve domestic harmony or judicial resources;
instead, it perpetuates bias against battered women seeking redress for civil
wrongs.
2. Statute of Limitations
Another obstacle for battered women seeking recovery for their injuries, is
the relatively short statute of limitations for those tort actions currently
available. The statute of limitations bars commencement of a suit after a given
period of time. In traditional tort actions of assault and battery, the statute of
limitations is typically only a few years from the date of the injury. In Ohio for
example, the statute of limitations for a tort of assault or battery is two years
after the cause of action accrues.1 98 Thus, in a battered woman's situation,
where she is paralyzed by fear during years of abuse, she is afforded recovery
for only the most recent beatings. Because courts do not toll the statute of
limitations for torts committed during the marriage, injuries inflicted five, ten,
or fifteen years ago remain uncompensated. 199
Even in the criminal context, the statute of limitations may be relatively
short. For example, in Ohio, the statute of limitations for prosecution of
felonious assault is six years200 and simple assault, a misdemeanor, is only two
years.201 Thus, the batterer likely escapes criminal as well as civil punishment
because a battered woman is often fearful of commencing either action. If she
escapes the cycle of violence, it may be too late to proceed with her complaint.
1961d. at 364 (citing 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442, reprinted in W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 122, at 859 (4th ed. 1971)).
197Tobias, supra note 195, at 441-67.
1 9 8OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2305.10(A) (Anderson 1996).
199Kohler, supra note 189, at 1052.
200OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.11 (Anderson 1996) defines the crime of felonious
assault. Section 2901.13 sets forth the statute of limitations for criminal prosecutions.
201OHio REV. CODE ANN. § 2903.13 (Anderson 1996) defines the crime of assault and
categorizes it as a misdemeanor. Section 2901.13 sets forth the statute of limitations for
criminal prosecutions. If the batterer is charged under the Domestic Violence provision
of the Ohio Revised Code, the first offense is considered a misdemeanor while
subsequent violations of the provision or other assault and battery provisions may be
considered a felony. OHIo REV. CODE ANN. § 2919-25.
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3. The Option of a Continuing Tort
Because it is patently unfair for an abuser to escape all liability for his actions,
a possible solution is the concept of a continuous tort. A continuing tort is
defined as:
one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that
is repeated until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of
action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a statute of limitations is
occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from
an original violation.
202
False imprisonment, trespass, nuisance and some civil rights violations are
common examples of continuous torts.203 Usually however, courts and statutes
do not recognize personal injury torts as continuous.204 Historically, personal
injuries were not viewed as continuous in nature because "the injury was
caused by an isolated incident, such as an assault and battery or a motor vehicle
accident."205 This theory, although plausible in everyday assault and battery
tort actions, does not take into consideration the "cumulative effect" of domestic
abuse.206 Continuous, unlawful beatings plunge a woman deeper into the cycle
of violence and can intensify the phenomenon of learned helplessness. "[E]very
time the batterer beats his victim, he is beating a person who is already injured,
thereby exacerbating those injuries."207 While not minimizing the tortious
injuries inflicted by a complete stranger, the situation is vastly different from
enduring relentless abuse by an intimate partner. In the former, the incident is
likely a one-time occurrence. In the latter, the woman is systematically beaten,
lives paralyzed by fear, and often develops chronic health problems directly
resulting from the beatings.
202Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 754 (Idaho 1993).
203Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 820 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 (Tex. 1993).
204Kohler, supra note 189, at 1053. Jill Lebowitz, Case Comment, Giovine v. Giovine:
Pursuit of Tort Claims for Domestic Violence in New Jersey and the Creation of a New Tort
Cause of Action for 'Battered Woman's Syndrome,' 17 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 259, 261-62
(1996); See Kohler, supra note 189, at 1054 ("Unfortunately, the theory of continuing tort
in spousal abuse cases has had limited success."); Compare with Karjala v. Johns-Manville
Prod. Corp., 523 F.2d 155 (8th Cir. 1975) (applying the concept of a continuing tort to
asbestos exposure); Bustamento v. J.D. Tucker, 607 So.2d 532 (La. 1992) (finding sexual
harassment a continuing tort).
205 Lebowitz, supra note 204, at 261-62.
206 Kohler, supra note 189, at 1050. See also supra notes 56-76 and accompanying text
discussing the health effects of battered women syndrome.
207 Kohler, supra note 189, at 1050.
1997-981
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
A Texas court was one of the first willing to apply the continuous tort theory
to a wife's claim for negligent infliction of emotional distress. 208 In Twynan v.
Twyman, the court held that the conduct which caused the plaintiff's emotional
distress was not a series of intentional acts each with its own statute of
limitations but instead ruled that her "cause of action is not complete and does
not accrue until the tortious acts have ceased." 209 The court further noted that
"'[s]ince usually no single incident in a continuous chain of tortious activity can
fairly or realistically be identified as the cause of significant harm, it seems
proper to regard the cumulative effect of the conduct as actionable.'- 210
Another court, applying the continuous tort theory in domestic situations, also
did so in the context of an emotional distress claim.2 11 In Curtis v. Firth, the
Idaho Supreme Court determined that "[bly its very nature [intentional
infliction of emotional distress] will often involve a series of acts over a period
of time, rather than one single act causing severe emotional distress. For that
reason we recognize the concept of a continuing tort... should be extended to
apply in other limited contexts. ' 212
However, even if the continuing tort theory of emotional abuse is accepted,
emotional distress actions have met with limited success in some courts.213
"[Miany of the decisions recognizing emotional distress have relied on acts of
assault and battery to prove the outrageousness of the conduct and relegated
the emotional distress to parasitic-type damages. 214 In other words, in
domestic torts, these types of damages have the most success when they are
accompanied by assault and battery actions. Thus, even if courts allow battered
women to recover for emotional distress under a continuing tort theory, women
who are physically hurt may still be barred by the statute of limitations for those
injuries.
208Twyman v. Twyman, 790 S.W.2d 819, 821 (Tex. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd on other
grounds, 855 S.W.2d 619 ('ex. 1993) (stating that "neither party cites authority applying
continuing tort to negligent infliction of emotional distress" cases).
209790 S.W.2d at 821.
2101d. (quoting Page v. United States, 729 F.2d 818,821-22 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Although
the court of appeals decision was later reversed by the Texas Supreme Court, the opinion
did not address the court of appeal's ruling that emotional distress constituted a
continuing tort. The court of appeals decision was reversed because it was based on a
theory of negligent infliction of emotional distress. The Texas Supreme Court had
recently ruled that a cause of action for negligent infliction of emotional distress no
longer existed. However, the Texas Supreme Court "expressly adopt[ed]" the tort of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and held that the case should be remanded
to the trial court for a determination based on that theory.
211Curtis v. Firth, 850 P.2d 749, 755 (Idaho, 1993).
212Id.
213 See Kohler, supra note 189, at 1057-64.
2 14 1d. at 1057.
[Vol. 12:407
BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME
4. Joinder and Res Judicata
Additional bars to civil suits for domestic violence also include joinder and
res judicata.215 In this context, joinder refers to whether a tort action should be
brought together with the divorce proceedings. In a few states, joinder of the
tort action is mandatory or "encouraged. 216 For instance, New Jersey's "entire
controversy doctrine" requires domestic violence tort litigation to accompany
the divorce proceedings or otherwise be barred from filing suit.217 The doctrine
"is a preclusionary principle intended to prevent the fractionalization of
litigation by requiring all claims between the same parties arising out of or
relating to the same transactional circumstances to be joined in a single
action. 218 This strict rule disadvantages women who fail to bring their tort
action at the time of the divorce because of fear, lack of knowledge of their rights
or embarrassment. 219
Other states cite the inherent differences between a divorce action and tort
suit and forbid joinder.220 Jurisdictions follow this rule believing that tort
claims "are legal in nature [and] should be kept separate from divorce actions,
which are equitable in nature."221 However, forbidding joinder is also
potentially disadvantageous for women who may not be prepared to
commence a separate, expensive and emotionally draining lawsuit after
finalizing a divorce.222 Thus, permissive joinder appears to be the best
alternative as a flexible rule gives the woman the opportunity to make the
decision herself based on her specific situation. Permissive joinder allows the
woman to unite the divorce and tort action if she determines that is her best
course of action.
Although permissive joinder appears to be the best option, claim preclusion
or res judicata, can still bar the separate tort action.223 Thus, if part or all of the
215 See Dalton, supra note 191, at 374-77; Kristyn J. Krohse, Note, No Longer Following
the Rule of Thumb- What to Do with Domestic Torts and Divorce Claims, 1997 U. Ill. L. Rev.
923 (1997); Snyder, supra note 137, at 354-60.
216Snyder, supra note 137, at 357-58.
217Giovine v. Giovine, 663 A.2d 109, 113 (N.J. Sup. Ct. App. Div. 1995), overruled on
other grounds by Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1997).
218 Brown v. Brown, 506 A.2d 29,32 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 1986).
219 Lebowitz, supra note 204, at 267.
220States which forbid joinder include Arizona, Colorado, New Hampshire, Illinois,
Utah and Vermont. Dalton, supra note 191, at 375.
221Snyder, supra note 137, at 355 (citing Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988)).
222See Kohler, supra note 189, at 1043; Snyder, supra note 137, at 355-56.
223See Dalton, supra note 191, at 378-79. Dalton also notes that in Massachusetts, the
doctrine of equitable estoppel is also used to prevent spouses from bringing a separate
tort action after the divorce. Dalton cites Heacock v. Heacock, 520 N.E.2d 151 (Mass.
1988), affd 568 N.E.2d 621 (Mass. App. Ct. 1991), which disallowed a wife's tort action
against her abusive husband holding that the husband was "disadvantaged by not
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aspects of a tort suit are considered in the divorce action or the settlement, this
acts as an "absolute bar to a subsequent action involving the same claim,
demand or cause of action.' 224
IV. BATrERED WOMEN SYNDROME AS AN AFFIRMATIVE TORT CAUSE OF ACrION
Although there are many obstacles to instituting tort actions against a
batterer, the persistent problem appears to be the tolling of the statute of
limitations. "Courts have shown a near universal reluctance" to toll the short
statute of limitations for torts committed during marriage or marriage like
relationships.225 And even if courts eventually choose to toll the statute of
limitations, traditional torts such as assault and battery do not fully recognize
the extent of injuries associated with battered women. Typically, battered
women do not just suffer from single incidents of abuse. Rather, they are
trapped in a cycle of abuse in which each new incident perpetuates and
worsens the battered woman's condition.
The response of the legal system should be to recognize a new tort cause of
action unique to battered women. "Family law practitioners are finding new
and expanded remedies for victims of spousal abuse in civil court."226 It is not
unheard of for courts to create new causes of action. 227 For instance, in 1986,
the Supreme Court of New Hampshire recognized the new cause of action of
wrongful birth.228 Other emerging torts include the interference with a
parent-child relationship,229 and the tortious transmission of a sexual
disease.230 It is within the power of the courts and the legislatures to assist
battered women in obtaining full recovery. Not only would this new tort
alleviate some of the problems with bringing traditional tort actions, it would
stand as a symbolic victory for battered women. Society and the legal system
knowing, at the time of his divorce, that his wife was planning the later tort claim."
Dalton, supra note 191, at 380.
224 BLACKs'S LAW DIcIONARY 1305 (6th ed. 1990).
225Snyder, supra note 137, at 360.
226 Karp, intentional Infliction, supra note 140, at 389.
2271d. See also supra notes 183-88 and accompanying text identifying non-traditional
torts actions pled in domestic situations.
228 Smith v. Cote, 513 A.2d 341 (N.H. 1986). This was an action brought by parents
whose child was born with severe defects. The action was against a physician who
negligently failed to inform the parents of the possibility that the mother would give
birth to a child with severe defects. The tort is based on the idea that the parents lacked
the right to make an informed decision whether to abort the child or carry it to term. Id.
at 342-43.
229 See e.g. D&D Fuller CATV v. Pace 780 P.2d 520 (Colo. 1989) (mother successfully
brought suit against her in-laws for tortious interference with mother-son relationship
resulting from the in-laws financial assistance in the kidnapping of their grandson).
230See e.g. Doe v. Roe, 267 Cal. Rptr. 564 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
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should give credence to their claims and it is within the power of the courts
and the legislatures to assist them in obtaining full recovery.
The tort of battered women syndrome is both an addition to and an
expansion of the current body of tort law.231 The tort of battered women
syndrome is a new action in that it has elements distinct from other torts; it is
also an expansion of the already existing continuous tort theory recognized in
trespass, nuisance and false imprisonment claims.232
A. Cases Which Come Close to Recognizing a New Tort of
Battered Women Syndrome
In Davis v. Bostick,233 the plaintiff argued that the defendant "'engaged in an
intentional course of conduct designed to inflict emotional stress and mental
anguish."' 234 At trial, the jury was instructed to ignore the statute of limitations
because a continuous tort was alleged.235 The appellate court concluded that
substantial evidence supported plaintiff's claim of ten incidents occurring over
a period of two years. These incidents included striking, choking and
threatening to kill the plaintiff, destroying her property, defaming plaintiff and
harassing plaintiff's family and friends.236 However, the appellate court
determined that each incident was individually actionable, each with its own
statute of limitations237 and that the trial court erred in "striking the statute of
limitations defense."238 The appellate court stated that "[tihe acts were
discontinuous in the sense that each had a beginning and an end, each was
separated from the next by some period of relative quiescence, and each was
capable of producing compensable harm."23 9 The court "impl[ied] that there
could never be a cumulative effect from a continuous course of assaults and
batteries."240
2 3 1Although I believe the tort of battered women syndrome it is both a new tort and
an expansion of existing tort law, for purposes of simplicity in the remainder of this
Note, I refer to the action simply as a "new" tort.
232Robert A. Clifford, Two States Give Battered Women Tort Option, CHICAGo LAWYER,
Dec. 1995, available in Westlaw, Allnews Library at *1; see infra note 267 and
accompanying text citing the possible elements of the tort.
233580 P.2d 544 (Or. 1978).
2 3 4 Id. at 545 (quoting plaintiff's allegations).
2351d. at 547.
2361d. at 545-46.
2 3 7 Davis, 580 P.2d at 548.
238Id.
239id.
24 0 Kohler, supra note 189, at 1050.
1997-981
JOURNAL OF LAW AND HEALTH
Conversely, the court in Curtis v. Firth,24 1 did allow the tolling of the statute
of limitations in a plaintiff's claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. In Curtis, the plaintiff presented testimony that she suffered from
"Battered Wife Syndrome" and Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder.242 Testimony at
trial elicited the existence of an identifiable cycle of violence.243 The court held
that the plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress
constituted a continuing tort and that the tortious acts ceased when the plaintiff
was evicted from the home.244 The court essentially reached the same result it
would have reached had it recognized a tort of battered women syndrome.
In de la Croix de Lafayette v. de la Croix de Lafayette,245 the plaintiff explicitly
asked the court to recognize a new tort of spousal abuse. The plaintiff argued
that the court should consider "individual acts of violence as part of an ongoing
pattern" and that new tort would include all acts of assault, battery and
psychological abuse.246 The new tort's three year statute of limitations would
begin to run at the last incident of abuse.247 Rejecting this argument, the court
held that "[niothing in this record suggests that a new tort of a continuing
nature is required to adequately address the occurrences between these
parties."248 However, the plaintiff did not submit expert testimony regarding
battered women syndrome which may account for the court's ruling that a new
tort was not needed to address the plaintiff's claims. 249 Perhaps if the record
reflected the cumulative effect of the beatings and the plaintiff's inability to
remove herself from the abusive relationship, the court may have ruled
differently.
However, in Laughlin v. Breaux,250 the plaintiff did present expert testimony
that she suffered from battered woman syndrome, yet the court refused to find
that it constituted a continuing tort. The court held that learned helplessness
did not "produce such an incapacity in [the] [p]laintiff that she was unable to
file suit."251 The court further stated that defendant's alleged abuse did not
constitute a continuing tort because that concept "only applies when
continuous conduct causes continuing damages... [and in this case] each
241850 P.2d 749, 755 (Idaho, 1993).
2 4 2 d. at 752.
2431d. at 751.
244 d. at 755.
24515 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1501 (D.C. Super. Ct. Aug. 14, 1989).
2461d. at 1502.
247Md.
248Id.
249 Kohler, supra note 189, at 1065; See de la Croix de Lafayette, 15 FAM. L. REP. at 1502.
250515 So. 2d 480 (1st Cir. 1987).
251 d. at 482.
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incident of battery and of assault is separate, and gives rise to a separate cause
of action.' 252 The court reasoned that because the bruises, soreness and
emotional upset were "immediately apparent," the statute of limitations runs
from that time.253 Even though the court acknowledged that the abuse "may
have combined to produce" the plaintiff's battered women syndrome it still
declined to apply the continuing tort concept or create a new cause of action.254
B. The New Jersey Cases
Despite many courts' unreceptive attitudes toward treating battered
women's injuries as a continuous tort or as a .tort cause of action in itself,
battered women have found justice in New Jersey. In a landmark ruling, the
New Jersey Supreme Court was the first to recognize an affirmative tort of
battered women syndrome.255 In Cusseaux v. Pickett, the court denied
defendant's motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action and held
"that the 'battered-woman's syndrome' is now a cognizable cause of action
under the laws of New Jersey."256 The court relied on another New Jersey
Supreme Court case, State v. Kelly,257 which recognized the validity of battered
women syndrome in the criminal context.
Kelly determined that battered women syndrome testimony was critical to
the defendant's self-defense claim as it was necessary to understand
defendant's state of mind.258 The court cited bias toward battered women in
case law, statutes, and law enforcement agencies, as well as problems of
stereotypes and myths about battered women. 259
The Cusseaux court, relied heavily on State v. Kelly and the state's Prevention
of Domestic Violence Act.260 The court cited the following legislative history:
'The Legislature finds and declares that domestic violence is a serious
crime against society . . . [and it] is therefore, the intent of the
Legislature to assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum
protections from abuse the law can provide ... Further, it is the
responsibility of the courts to protect victims of violence that occurs in
a family or family-like setting by providing access to both emergent
252id.
2531d. at 483.
254Laughlin, 515 So. 2d at 483.
255Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789 (N.J. 1994).
2561d. at 789.
257State v. Kelly, 478 A.2d 364 (N.J. 1984).
25 8 1d. at 375-76.
2 5 9 1d. at 370.
260 prevention of Domestic Violence Act. L. 1981, c. 426, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-1 to -16,
(repealed and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -33 enacted in their place.)
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and long-term civil and criminal remedies and sanctions, and by
ordering those remedies and sanctions that are available to assure the
safety of the victims and the public. To that end, the Legislature
encourages ... the broad application of the remedies available under
this act in the civil and criminal courts of this state.'
2 61
The Cusseaux court reasoned that the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act
recognized the inadequacies of the law with regard to battered women. 26 2 As
proven in State v. Kelly, where the "existing criminal statutes "263 were
insufficient to address the problem of battered women, "so too are the civil laws
of assault and battery insufficient to redress the harms suffered as a result of
domestic violence." 264 The court reasoned that the courts are required to fill in
the gaps created by the legislature.265
The court articulated four elements which the plaintiff must prove to succeed
in sustaining an action for battered women syndrome. These elements are not
limited to spouses but can include any "domestic intimate partnership"
whether it be heterosexual or homosexual, married or unmarried. 266 A person
may plead battered-person syndrome as long as the following elements are
met. The plaintiff must prove:
(1) involvement in a marital or marital-like intimate relationship; and
(2) physical or psychological abuse perpetrated by the dominant
partner to the relationship over an extended period of time; and (3) the
aforestated abuse has caused recurring physical or psychological
injury over the course of the relationship; and (4) a past or present
inability to take any action to improve or alter the situation
unilaterally.
267
The statute of limitations would begin with the last incident of abuse.268
2 6 1 Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 792 (N.J. 1994) (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18).
26 2Ruth Jones, Battered Women's Syndrome as a Cause of Action, DOMESflc VIOLENCE
RPT. Dec./Jan. 1996, at 10.
26 3Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 793.
2641d.
2651d.
266[d. at 794 n.7.
267Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 793-94. Other elements suggested for the tort action are: (1)
intentional acts; (2) of extreme and outrageous conduct; (3) of a continuous nature; (4)
proximately causing; (5) physical injury or emotional distress. Kohler, supra note 189,
at 1068. Although Kohler proposes that the statute of limitations would begin to run
following the last act of violence, the statute should not start running until women
actually leave their abusive relationship as there are many factors preventing them from
escaping the cycle of violence. See supra notes 16-55 and accompanying text.
2681n continuous torts, the statute starts to run when the last tortious act ceases.
Lebowitz, supra note 204, at 262.
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The Cusseaux court criticized the decision in Laughlin v. Breaux269 which
rejected the notion of a continuing tort for battered women's injuries.2 70 The
Cusseaux court stated that it is "cruel" and against public policy to limit the
recovery of battered women and that failure to recognize this action is
equivalent to the court condoning domestic violence.271
Following the decision in Cusseaux, the New Jersey appellate court in Giovine
v. Giovine272 determined that the statute of limitations could be tolled based on
evidence of battered women syndrome and that such acts giving rise the
syndrome constituted a continuing tort.273 The Giovine court claimed
disagreement with the Cusseaux holding "predicated upon semantics"274 and
stated that battered women syndrome itself is not the continuing tort but "more
correctly," battered women syndrome is "the medical condition resulting from
continued acts of physical or psychological misconduct."275 In other words, the
Giovine court appeared more comfortable identifying actual conduct instead of
a medical condition as a tort. "Regardless of how the Giovine court phrases it,
whether it be through recognition of the continuous tort of [battered women
syndrome], or through recognition of the medical condition [battered women
syndrome] which gives rise to a continuous tort,"276 the court allowed the
tolling of the statute of limitations and recognized recovery for both physical
and psychological injuries inflicted on battered women.277
Similar to the situation in the criminal context, expert testimony is essential
to prove the continuous tort of battered women syndrome. The four-part test
articulated in Cusseaux requires the plaintiff to establish physical or
psychological injury and an inability to take action to stop the abuse.278 This
implicates the need for expert testimony on the cycle of violence and learned
helplessness. Likewise, the Giovine court explicitly stated that without expert
testimony, "the wife cannot be deemed to be suffering from battered woman's
syndrome, and each act of abuse during the marriage would constitute a
separate and distinct cause of action in tort, subject to the statute of limita-
269515 So.2d 480 (1st Cir. 1987).
270Cusseaux, 652 A.2d at 794.
2 7 1Id.
272663 A.2d 109, 113 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995), overruled on other grounds by
Kinsella v. Kinsella, 696 A.2d 556 (N.J. 1997).
2731d.
274Id. at 114.
2751d. at 115.
276Lebowitz, supra note 204, at 268.
277Giovine, 663 A.2d at 115.
2 7 8 Cusseaux v. Pickett, 652 A.2d 789, 793-94 (N.J. 1994).
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tions."279 Giovine cited three instances in which expert testimony was
fundamental to court proceedings. Giovine first cited State v. Kelly and the
importance of expert testimony to prove self-defense. 280 Giovine then discussed
State v. Ellis, 281 where expert testimony was relevant in "explain[ing] why a
victim of a kidnapping neither attempted to escape a kidnapper nor
immediately reported the kidnapping."282 And finally, the court cited Cusseaux
v. Pickett's requirement that the women suffer from a medically diagnosable
condition of battered woman syndrome to prove the tort of battered women
syndrome.283
The Giovine and Cusseaux opinions are essentially the same. Their awareness
of the unique injuries of battered women led both courts to fashion a remedy
specifically for victims of domestic violence. They both recognize that the result
of repeated abuse by a domestic partner can lead to battered women syndrome
and that expert testimony is needed to prove this fact.
C. Why this New Cause of Action is Necessary
The tort of battered women syndrome is needed to hold batterers responsible
for the "full consequences of their actions" and to afford full recovery to victims
of domestic abuse.284 Not only does this tort toll the traditional statute of
limitations, it is an emotional and symbolic victory for women who have
endured the battering cycle.
The reluctance to recognize this necessary tort of battered women syndrome
"is perplexing at best."285 Perhaps courts believe that existing remedies are
sufficient to deal with the problem. 286 However, the short statute of limitations
for traditional intentional torts, limits recoveries for battered women and
sometimes completely bars their actions. Even more troublesome is the
reluctance of some courts in recognizing emotional injuries absent physical
evidence.287 Thus, the courts are wrong when insisting that adequate remedies
are available and a new action for battered women is not warranted.
279 Giovine, 663 A.2d at 114.
2801d. at 113.
281656 A.2d 25 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1995).
282 Giovine, 663 A.2d at 113-14 (citing Ellis, 656 A.2d 25).
2831d. at 114.
284Snyder, supra note 137, at 363-64.
285Kohler, supra note 189, at 1066.
2861d.
2871d. at 1057-1066. Kohler discusses a case in which recovery for intentional infliction
of emotional distress is allowed only when damages attach as "parasitic" to assault and
battery. Id. at 1057-58. She also cites a case where a higher burden of proof for such
claims is required. Kohler, supra note 189, at 1058-60. See also Karp, Intentional Infliction,
supra note 140, at 399 (stating that although some courts have found intentional infliction
of emotional distress absent physical injury, many others have found the evidence
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Courts may also believe that criminal punishment will suffice in domestic
abuse situations. However, many batterers may also escape punishment in
criminal courts because of the short statute of limitations for some crimes.288
Even if criminal remedies are available against thebatterer, this does not replace
the need for civil suits. Civil lawsuits are different from criminal prosecutions.
In a civil lawsuit, the standard of review is less stringent and the defendant is
forced to testify.289
Another possible reason for courts' apprehension in allowing this new cause
of action is that with every new development in tort law, there is fear of creating
a flood of new litigation. 290 This excuse however, is exaggerated and unfair.
For example, courts believed that judicial recognition of claims for emotional
distress would encourage fraudulent actions. 291 There was also a concern that
mental injury was too subjective to assess damages and that a" 'wide door' "
would be open to claims for "mere bad manners. "292 However, these obstacles
were not insurmountable and intentional infliction of emotional distress is now
widely recognized. New actions should not be avoided merely because they
may be difficult to adjudicate. 293
Restraintist courts sometimes dislike departing from precedent and creating
new causes of action. This view holds that the legislature is the elected branch
responsible for creating laws and the function of the judiciary is only to
interpret their meaning. However, "it has never been of much use to contend
that merely because an action is new it cannot be brought... [tiorts of a specific
character have increased steadily in number throughout our legal history, and
the courts can even now, if they think fit, enlarge the list."294
Finally, other courts may be unwilling to recognize this new cause of action
because of the criticism of battered women syndrome by feminist scholars in
"insufficient").
288See supra notes 200-01 and accompanying text.
289 Perhaps these differences contributed to the different outcomes in the recent
criminal and civil trials of O.J. Simpson.
290Kohler, supra note 189, at 1067.
2 9 1PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, § 12, at 56.
2 9 2PROSSER &KEETON, supra note 6, § 12, at 56.
293
"That some claims may be spurious should not compel those who administer
justice to shut their eyes to serious wrongs and let them go without being brought to
account. It is the function of the courts and juries to determine whether claims are valid
or false. This responsibility should not be shunned merely because the task may be
difficult to perform. JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 68-69 (quoting the Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts in Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., 355 N.E.2d 315, 317-18 (Mass.
1976)).
294 JOHNSON, supra note 143, at 1 (citing Percy H. Winfield, The Foundation of Liability
in Tort, 27 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 4-5 (1927)).
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the criminal context.295 Although a debate ensues as to whether battered
women syndrome constitutes a separate, identifiable defense, the same
concerns are not raised in the civil context. 296 Even if a "special" defense for
battered women hinders equality in criminal trials, no such concern is evident
in civil litigation. In a tort action, a battered woman seeks compensation for her
injuries and is not attempting to justify her own wrongful acts.
Lenore Walker's widely accepted theory supports the idea that it is difficult
for women to extricate themselves from the cycle of violence. Women are
usually unable to bring a civil cause of action within the short statute of
limitations for intentional torts because they are stuck in abusive situations.
Sometimes, because of psychological abuse, women do not recognize the full
extent of their injuries until much later. Additionally, if a criminal sanction is
not pending, women may fear retaliation from their batterers if they initiate a
civil action. Therefore, battered women need a special tort to accommodate
their paralysis and recognize all injuries.
V. THE TORT OF BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME AS A SOLUTION TO A PUBLIC
HEALTH PROBLEM
Because the incidents of domestic violence remain extraordinarily high, the
well-being of our nation's women and children are surely at risk.297 Therefore,
in addition to affording battered women full recovery for their injuries,
recognition of a new cause of action would also aid in the fight against curbing
a national public health epidemic, as tort litigation "is an unusually sensitive
barometer to health and safety-related events."298 If past litigation in the area
of public health is any indication, the recognition that accompanies increased
litigation will likely generate more assistance to those suffering from this
reprehensible societal ill.
Advocates for social change commonly use the court system to bring about
successful results. Such an example is evidenced by the successful litigation
ending racial segregation in education.299 Similarly, national public health
295 Critics argue that Lenore Walker's theory of battered women syndrome
perpetuates negative stereotypes of women which results in unequal rights at trial in
self-defense cases. See supra notes 121-28 and accompanying text.
296Although the debate continues, under current law, battered women syndrome is
not a separate defense.
297
"Domestic violence has been called a national epidemic by physicians, public
health experts, and political leaders." Jean Abbott, et al., Domestic Violence Against
Women: Incidence and Prevalence in an Emergency Department Population, 273 JAMA 1763(1995), available in Westlaw, 1995 WL 10027573; "Domestic violence is increasingly
recognized as a major public health problem, affecting individuals of all ethnic and
socioeconomic backgrounds. Hyman, supra note 2, at 1781; See supra notes 2, 56-62 and
accompanying text providing statistics on the prevalence of domestic abuse.
298Rabin, supra note 8, at 856.
299 Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S.483 (1954). For historyand a detailed account
of the fight against racial segregation in education, see RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE:
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problems are also commonly resolved through litigation. Mass torts such as
asbestos, breast implants, Bendectin, and most recently, the tobacco lawsuits,
are examples of ways in which litigation spurs resolution of major public health
issues.300
On a more individualized basis, alcohol related fatalities were once referred
to "America's 'socially accepted form of murder."'30 1 However, the 1980's
brought about drastic reform measures designed to reduce drunk driving
incidents and its damaging effects on the health and safety of the public. 30 2
This decrease is attributable to the strengthening of criminal penalties, sobriety
checkpoints, public safety campaigns by groups such as Mothers Against
Drunk Driving, and the creation of social host liability.303
Social host liability is the imposition of civil liability on persons furnishing
alcohol to inebriated guests who later cause harm to third persons.304 By using
litigation to impose liability on social hosts, the sources of compensation to
injured victims are increased while simultaneously "inducing responsible
behavior from more individuals."30 5 Although drunk driving will never
disappear, it seems that combating the problem through the courts, the
legislatures, and public safety campaigns successfully resulted in much safer
roadways for the public.
Arguably, many of these advances in health and safety resulted from the
imposition of monetary damages on defendants. Such damages are sure to act
as a strong deterrent to future wrongful conduct. But in addition to this factor,
the educational role of tort lawsuits cannot be underestimated. First, the public
THE HISTORY OF BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR
EQUALITY (1976). See also MARK V. TUSHNET, THE NAACP'S LEGAL STRATEGY AGAINST
SEGREGATED EDUCATION, 1925-1950 (1987).
300 See e.g. Lucinda M. Finley, Female Trouble: The Implications of Tort Reform for Women,
64 TENN. L. REv. 847 (1997); Rebecca S. Dresser et al, Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond
Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 705, 743-44 (1997); Joseph Sanders, The Bedectin
Litigation: A Case Study in the Life Cycle of Mass Torts, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 301, 303 (1992);
Anna Burdeshaw Fretwell, Clearing the Air: An Argument for a Federal Cause of Action to
Provide an Adequate Remedy for Smokers Injured by Tobacco Companies, 31 GA. L. REv. 929,
931 (1997).
301 Mark Starr, The War Against Drunk Drivers, NEWSWEEK, Sept. 30, 1982 at 34.
302 John R. Ashmead, Comment, Putting a Cork on Social Host Liability: New York Rejects
a Trend: D'Amico v. Christie, 55 BROOK. L. REv. 995, 995 (1989).
303Starr, supra note 301, at 34.
304Ashmead, supra note 302, at 996.
3051d. Indeed, "[slince New Jersey's social host liability statute was enacted in 1987,
the state has seen a number of fatalities caused by drunk driving decrease by over fifty
percent." Greg K. Vitali, Note, An In-Depth Analysis of the Development and Ramifications
of New Jersey's Social Host Liability Statute, 20 SETON HALL LEGIS. J. 532, 537 (1996).
Although this reduction is not solely attributable to imposing tort liability on third
persons, it seems clear that at the very least, this type of litigation educates the public
on the risks of such behavior, and deters future dangerous conduct.
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becomes more aware of pressing issues surrounding lawsuits through media
coverage and resulting debates about the correctness of such legal action.
Second, increased litigation tends to channel funding and research toward
issues of concern. For instance, in the 1980's, actions involving breast implant
and asbestos, spawned research by both plaintiffs and defendants seeking to
create a body of scientific evidence that would help prove their cases in the
future.306 Finally, when the public becomes more aware of societal and public
health problems, demands for political action are sure to follow.
The new tort of battered women syndrome would increase litigation in this
area because the chances for recovery would not be so remote. This increased
litigation would certainly draw attention to the plight of battered women,
educating the public and generating more support for their cause. Hopefully,
as in other public health issues, opening the courtroom to battered women will
eventually result in decreased instances of domestic violence. Public support
may encourage some women to leave their batterers by giving them more
choices once they take that step. Ultimately, winning tort lawsuits against
batterers affords women full compensation for their injuries, and serves as an
enormous symbolic victory in the fight for the health and safety of abused
women.
VI. CONCLUSION
Domestic violence is an epidemic. Although society does not have a cure, it
can, in some instances, alleviate the harsh realities that accompany women
caught in the cycle of violence. Undoubtedly, there is a real need to draw more
attention to the problem of domestic abuse in our culture. Because society and
the legal system have been slow to respond, the numbers of women subjected
to domestic violence are still enormously high.30 7 The poor conditions under
which many shelters currently operate, signifies that not enough attention is
given to this problem.308
306 Conversation with Peter H. Weinberger, partner with the firm of Spangenberg,
Shibley & Liber in Cleveland, Ohio (January, 1997); See also Dresser, supra note 300, at
743-44 C[Llitigation piqued public and manufacturer interest in learning more about
implant safety. .. A similar burst of scientific research occurred as a result of Bendectin
litigation.")
3 0 7 See Ammons, Clemency, supra note 60, at 61-74 (discussing the development of legal
rights for battered women); See also supra notes 2, 56-62 and accompanying text
discussing the high numbers of women affected by domestic abuse.
3 0 8 See e.g., Clemency, supra note 60, at 70-71 (citations omitted).
According to former Surgeon General C. Everett Koop, it took 100 years
to create the first shelter, after Congress passed a law to prevent cruelty
to animals. Even today, with approximately 1,200 shelters nationwide,
the demand far exceeds the need for safe havens for women and children.
The public policy priority of providing assistance is dramatized by the
following comparison. There are 2,600 animal shelters nationally as com-
pared with the 1,200 battered women shelters.
[Vol. 12:407
BATTERED WOMEN SYNDROME
Those suffering from battered women syndrome are in a unique
predicament, different from those subjected to a single, isolated instance of
abuse.309 Therefore, tort law must be molded to accommodate the needs of
battered women.310 "Real relief cannot come to battered women if they are left
to rely upon imaginative legal theories and the sporadic compassion of the
courts in combating inappropriately applied limitations statutes."311 The tort
of battered women syndrome is essential to guarantee fairness in the civil
litigation of domestic abuse and to aid in the fight against a public health
problem that has yet to be solved.
HEATHER TONSING
3 12
3 09 The author does not wish to trivialize single incidents of domestic violence. The
point is that women suffering from the syndrome are in need of the continuous tort so
they can receive full compensation. Women who experience isolated instances of abuse
and are not caught in the cycle are presumably able to pursue the wrongs under existing
remedies.
3 10Strict products liability was a response to the inadequacies of the negli-
gence regime ... Market-share liability theories respond to the plight
of victims who cannot identify the particular producer of an injurious
drug. The rules of causation have been adapted to accommodate the
victims of environmental torts. The discovery rule, softening the rigors
of statute of limitations, was developed to assist those who suffer from
injuries that manifest themselves only after passage of time... When
change happens, it is because courts have been moved by a desire to
recognize the plaintiffs' injuries, or a desire to hold the defendant class
accountable, or both. Victims of domestic violence, who urge recognition
of their injuries, an accommodation of their needs, and the accountability
of their abusers are participants in the grand tradition of tort reform."
Dalton, supra note 191, at 331-32.
311Snyder, supra note 137, at 362.
312After this note was selected for publication, a note dealing with similar issues was
published. See M. Mercedes Fort, Case note, A New Tort: Domestice Violence Gets the Status
it Deserves in Jewitt v. Jewitt, No. 93-2-01846-5 (Wash. Super. Ct. Spokane County, April 21,
1993), 21 S. ILL. U. L.J. 355 (1997).
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